NERVI SINE MOLE

Bellarmine Vindicated from the Cavils of Ames and Gerhard

VEIT ERBERMANN, S.J.

Sonnet 5 Translation

NERVI SINE MOLE,

That is,

A COMPENDIUM OF THE CONTROVERSIES

of the Most Eminent Lord ROBERT BELLARMINE, Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church,

Vindicated from the Cavils and Impostures

of

WILLIAM AMES, the English Puritan,

and

JOHN GERHARD, the Lutheran of Jena, &c.

By the Author

VEIT ERBERMANN,

of the Society of Jesus.

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VOLUME ONE
BOOK TWO
ON CHRIST

Chapter I

On the Communication of the Idioms of the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ. Bellarmine, Book 3, chapter 8 and following.

Here it pleases me (contrary to the method otherwise prefixed) to place Gerhard before Ames, and to shake out his ubiquitarian error, which he even labors ridiculously to impute to Bellarmine. Forming, then, in Disputation IV a twofold question on this matter; the first thus, generally: "Have truly divine and infinite gifts been truly and really communicated to Christ according to His human Nature, by virtue of the personal union and of His exaltation to the right hand of GOD?" The second, however, thesis 26, thus: "Has Omnipresence, among other divine Idioms, also been communicated to the humanity of Christ assumed?" Not only Bellarmine, along with all Catholics, and likewise the Calvinists, but even among the Lutherans the men of Helmstedt, of Nuremberg, and as many as refused to have their name entered in the Book of Concord, sharply deny this; to whom that portentous and Cyclopean Dogma seems, not so much a heresy as a foolishness, so that this saying is here most true: "No ugliness without a lover, no foolishness without a patron." Certainly Calixtus, though a Lutheran, nevertheless plainly pronounces: "He who says that Christ is, according to His human nature (by virtue of the personal union), omnipotent, omnipresent, etc. — that man is a Eutychian." Likewise, "Neither the error of the Papists concerning Transubstantiation, nor of the Calvinists concerning the real presence, is as abominable as that of the Lutherans concerning the Ubiquity of Christ as man, etc." What here does Titius say? Gerhard, however, confesses, theses 2, 3, 4, and 26, that Bellarmine openly teaches

that divine Omnipotence and Ubiquity cannot really be communicated to Christ's humanity: yet since this same Bellarmine establishes, Book 3, chapter 8, that the hypostatic Union consists in the communication of the subsistence of the Word, hence Gerhard infers: "If the very subsistence of the Word, which is the Idiom most proper to the Son of GOD, inasmuch as He is distinguished from the Father and Holy Spirit by a most intimate unity of the Godhead, is communicated to the assumed Humanity. But the former is so. Therefore also the latter. 2. If the very communication of the subsistence to the assumed humanity could occur, and has really occurred, without confusion and equalization of the Natures, why should not also the communication of the other divine attributes not immediately introduce confusion and equalization of the Natures, which Bellarmine fears? But the former is so. Therefore also the latter. 3. If the very subsistence of the Word is communicated to the assumed humanity, how will the essential attributes and the Logos not be communicated to the Humanity? since the hypostasis of the Logos is not something really distinct from the essential attributes and the divine Nature, considered with its mode of subsisting in the Son of GOD; otherwise the Person would be composed of two really distinct things. But that former is true. Therefore also this. Where nevertheless it must be noted that, in the connection of the Major, we proceed in this Mystery from the communication of the hypostasis to the communication of the essential, because we have Scripture as our guide and leader, and accordingly do not here rely on human reasonings, but on the oracles of the Holy Spirit." It pleased me to transcribe here word for word these Gerhardine discourses, most worthy of the Ubiquitarian and the Nonsense-monger. A triple hypothetical Major, on which the whole dispute hangs, is not even lightly proved, and though the Arguer himself noticed that he was everywhere begging the question, he thought it enough to say that he here does not rely on human reasonings (which is indeed too true: for even cattle at the plow would scarcely reason otherwise, if they were capable of any discourse) but on the oracles of the Holy Spirit — which is too false, unless by an impious equivocation the

"oracles of the Holy Spirit" mean the husk of Scripture's words, covering the portentous fantasy-mongering of the Ubiquitarians. It is a wonder that the greatest Theologian of the Lutherans dared, with such puerile ineptitude, to expose himself to the laughter of the whole World! What, I ask, does Titius say to this?

II. From the fact that Bellarmine, chapter 9, concedes that from the hypostatic union there follows a communication of Idioms, he says, thesis 9 and following, that the hypostatic communication of Idioms is rightly inferred, and that Bellarmine says in vain that this communication is not real with respect to the Natures themselves, as the Lutherans hold, nor is it plainly verbal, as the Calvinists hold, but is real with respect to the hypostasis of both Natures, not however with respect to the Natures themselves: "On the contrary," says Gerhard, "from Bellarmine's own conceded hypothesis, we can firmly gather thus: To whomever the divine subsistence of the Word is really communicated, to him also truly divine gifts are really communicated. To the assumed human Nature of Christ the divine subsistence of the Word is really communicated. Therefore to the assumed Nature also truly divine gifts are really communicated." But who does not see that the Major, resting on no support at all, but put forward as a self-evident axiom, requires the most robust proof, since precisely this is the chief matter in dispute? Nor in what follows does he bring anything but a variation of phrases. Nearly the same recurs from §3 to the first argument.

II. From the fact that Bellarmine, Book 4 On Christ, chapter 2, disputes that Christ's soul, from its very creation, was most full of wisdom and grace, and proves this from Isaiah 11, Psalm 44, Acts 4 and 10, Gerhard thus infers, thesis 13: "If to Christ, according to His assumed human Nature, grace and the Spirit are given without measure, so that from His fullness all could receive and still can; then also to Christ, according to His human Nature assumed at the very conception, truly divine and infinite gifts have been communicated. The reason of the connection is, because grace and the Spirit given without measure, and a

nature finite in essence, are antithetically opposed to each other. But the former is true. Therefore also the latter." Response: The reason of the connection is weak, indeed nonexistent. For the sense of those words of John 3 "for GOD gives not the Spirit by measure" is not that GOD so communicated the infinite attributes of divinity to Christ's humanity, that the humanity would be truly eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent (for these manifestly involve a contradiction — for how could that nature be omnipotent, which cannot produce itself? omnipresent, which begins and ceases to exist now in this, now in that place! eternal, which began to exist at a determinate time? etc.). The sense, then, is that GOD sanctified Christ's human nature through the infinite and uncreated sanctity of the Word — not indeed to the same degree that He communicates it to the personality of the Word itself, namely by identity; but to the degree it is capable of, namely by physical union, which is without doubt a lesser communication than identity. But as to created gifts, such as the light of glory, sanctifying Grace, etc. — these were communicated to Christ's soul in such intensity, that they must be reckoned morally infinite: indeed, if a created categorematic infinite were possible, without doubt these created gifts of infinite intensity would have to be admitted in Christ's soul. But from all this nothing is inferred concerning the real communication of divine properties in the human nature, since this is simply chimerical. Whence also falls Gerhard's fourth Inference, in which, thesis 14, from what Bellarmine, Book 4, chapter 4, said — "it is not credible that the Word, having personally become man, would not at the same time have poured into that Humanity, in the very Incarnation, all the gifts of which it was capable" — he assumes: "But if it was capable of the infinite subsistence of the Word (which Bellarmine concedes), then certainly it was also capable of the other idioms and gifts." The sequence and the parity are plainly denied. Scholastics in Part 3 of St. Thomas usually assign a manifold disparity between these, which I here omit.

V. From Book 3, chapter 1, where Bellarmine confesses that James Faber Stapulensis defended the ubiquitarian dogma, which Luther

followed, etc., Gerhard infers that this doctrine was already known and defended in the Church at the time the Augsburg Confession was presented; and that nevertheless the Emperor, with the Roman Catholic Princes, approved article 3 in the Response to it. Response: first, it is true that Stapulensis brought forth in Paris that monstrous ubiquity, but that this infernal offspring was soon strangled in its cradle, on 15 February 1526, in the Sorbonne College, as Father Laurence Forer reports, from the authentic Instrument of that Theological Faculty, dated 29 January 1631, to the Illustrious and Reverend Bishop of Augsburg, in a little book entitled "The Witness of the World of Christ against Ubiquity," published in 1658. Second, the Emperor indeed said, in the 3rd article, that there was nothing to be offended at — namely, if you look at the words as they stand, which even today all Catholics approve to that extent, insofar as they profess Catholic truth in a simple and obvious sense. But Andreas Fabricius rightly noted in the Harmony of the Confession, soon after the Response of the Emperor and the Catholic Princes: "Although the 3rd article, if you look at the words, may seem conformable to Catholic truth, yet if one closely weighs what monstrosities Luther and Melanchthon nourish here, one will easily detect impiety, etc." Similar things John Hofmeister indicates there. But nothing more is inferred from this, than that the ubiquitarians, under words which in themselves show nothing false, and which easily admit a Catholic sense, hid their poison — just as they also hide it under those words of the Creed: "and sits at the right hand of GOD the Father, etc." Certainly Calixtus himself, though a Lutheran, and bound by religion to the Augsburg Confession, felt the same as we do on this. What does Titius say to this?

VI. From the fact that Bellarmine, Book 3, chapter 16, §5, concedes that power over all creatures was conferred on Christ's humanity, etc., Gerhard says: "But this power over all creatures cannot be other than divine, infinite." But this he asserts, and does not prove; nor could it be proved, since it repugns to the omnipotence of a Creature. For it would have to exist before it exists, or to operate and not exist simultaneously,

etc. — subtleties accessible only to the minds of the Ubiquitarians! What here does Titius say?

VII. From the fullness of knowledge which Bellarmine, Book 4, chapter 1, attributes to Christ's soul, he infers, thesis 19: "To be filled with such knowledge, that one learns nothing afterward, which one did not know before, is to know all things and to have all the treasures of the Wisdom and Knowledge of GOD stored within, is to be omniscient. According to Bellarmine, Christ as man possessed such knowledge from the very Incarnation. Therefore Christ as man was omniscient." Response: The Major is too false. For even if Christ's soul knew all things which GOD knows with the knowledge of Vision (as many teach with St. Thomas — though not a few also deny it), He would not for that reason have known all possible things, all GOD's conditional decrees, and many other things which are required for comprehensive and divine knowledge.

§2. The Solutions of the Ubiquitarians Are Examined

And thus far Gerhard has seemed to attack Bellarmine from Bellarmine himself: next he tries to solve Bellarmine's arguments from the same source.

The first, from Book 3, chapter 1, is this: The Lutherans teach that Christ's flesh has the attributes of divinity — from which it follows that they are either Nestorians, or Eutychians, or a monster composed of both heresies. For if they say these are communicated essentially, they will be Eutychians; if accidentally, Nestorians. To this Gerhard says there is a third way, according to Bellarmine himself, Book 3, chapter 8, §"vera" — namely, personally. "For what he asserts about the union, we say the same about the communication which arises from the Union, and follows the Nature of the union." But Gerhard seems not to know what he is saying. For what is it, to be communicated personally? Or to communicate a person? That the attributes are communicated to the personality of the

Word identically, and accordingly essentially, is indeed most true; but this does nothing to the matter — whether they are communicated to the Humanity really and intrinsically, so that the Humanity is now truly and really and intrinsically eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent — no less than the Divinity? This, however, can be ascribed to it neither essentially nor accidentally, but only chimerically, as is clear from what has been said. Or finally, whether by virtue of the personal union those attributes are communicated intrinsically to the Humanity? But this indeed is true, insofar as they can truly be predicated in the concrete of each other; but it is very false and absurd that they can be communicated really, intrinsically, whether essentially, or personally, or accidentally — certainly no more than the divinity itself can be communicated to the humanity, and this to that, such that it could be said, "Divinity is Humanity," and vice versa. Would they themselves admit these and similar propositions: "The Word is the Humanity," "This is a Daughter consubstantial with the Father, etc."? I think not. But if the Word, immediately, through physical union, communicated to the Humanity, does not make this Daughter of GOD consubstantial with the Father; how do those attributes, which are communicated only through the mediation of the Word, render the Humanity, as such, eternal, omniscient, etc.?

Bellarmine, second: From true and real communication of Idioms it follows that there are two omnipotent, immeasurable, infinite things in the world, namely the Deity and the Humanity. Book 3, chapter 10, §"praeterea." Gerhard responds: "By the same manner, someone could argue against the communication of the Word's subsistence, conceded by Bellarmine: From the communication of the hypostasis it follows that there are two hypostases in Christ, namely of the Deity and of the Humanity." This argument comes down to exactly the same thing, and the response is the same. Third, in the following §, that those idioms would not be properties, but common things: Gerhard retorts that the same must be said of the subsistence of the Word communicated to the Humanity. But there is a clear disparity in each case between relative

subsistence and absolute attributes. For it is impossible that GOD be intrinsically united to a Creature, without formally perfecting the Creature — not indeed by giving it this or that peculiar denomination, e.g., of location, of cognition, etc. (for if He gave one of these, He would give all the others too, since there is no greater reason for one than for another, and would accordingly make GOD by essence, that is, a Being having all perfections). He gives, therefore, no such denomination, whose entity is not the duration, location, cognition, etc., of another, but of Himself; He gives, therefore, only this formal effect, that of being intrinsically united to GOD infinitely perfect. And because, in the notion of substantial perfection communicated in the first act and contingently, this perfection is infinite, it certainly cannot be increased, and therefore the creature subsists in that perfection. It is no wonder, then, if it receives from GOD, once united, the formal effect of subsisting. Second, if the absolute attributes of GOD, such as immensity, omnipotence, omniscience, were really and intrinsically and subjectively communicated to the Humanity, then it would become immense, omnipotent, eternal (or rather, in the abstract, immensity, omniscience, etc.), and thus there would really be two immense, eternal things, as Bellarmine's argument proves. But the hypostasis of the Word is so communicated to the Humanity, that this itself does not become the hypostasis of the Word, but only that it may subsist through it, and receive its final completion, in reason as substance, from that hypostasis; and thus it is manifest that this communication does not duplicate the hypostasis. Gerhard indeed tries to attribute what we said of this latter communication also to the former, when he says: "By the real communication of idioms a double omnipotence, omniscience, etc. is not introduced; but that very omnipotence and Logos, which is and remains eternally essentially proper to Him, exercises itself in the human nature, and through the human nature, to which it is personally communicated, without any multiplication of itself, or physical transfusion, or production of another omnipotence, etc." But the disparity we have assigned is not removed by this evasion. For either that

eternity, for example, of the Divinity is communicated to the Humanity really and intrinsically, such that it is truly and properly eternal just as the Divinity is; that is, it lacks beginning and end of itself; or it only communicates to it the denomination of being eternal, from the eternal Word to which it is immediately, and to the Divinity mediately, united. If the latter is said, then it hands the victory to the Catholic opinion; the former, evidently establishes two eternal things, namely the Humanity and the Divinity, and the former also, at the same time, temporal — which is without doubt chimerical, and overturns the whole mystery of the Incarnation.

§3. Gerhard's Special Points on Ubiquity

He says, thesis 27: "Bellarmine avoids the Omnipresence, which he twists over into the name of a horrid Ubiquity, yet establishes the same by his own hypotheses. For, first, he concedes that Christ, according to His human nature, has been carried up to GOD's right hand, and defines this right hand of GOD by power and dominion over all things," Book 3, chapter 15, §"secondly," etc. "There is, then, an explicit confession of Bellarmine's, that by the right hand of GOD, at which Christ sits, we must understand the divine glory, power, and Majesty. Likewise, that Christ, according to that Nature according to which He sits at GOD's right hand, reigns and judges all things with equal power and honor, with the Father Himself. What, then, remains, but that we firmly conclude in this way: According to whatever Nature Christ sits at GOD's right hand, according to that same He reigns with equal power and honor with the Father, and accordingly does not rule as absent, but as present in heaven and earth. But Christ, according to His human Nature, sits at GOD's right hand. Therefore." He saw that the connection and sinew of this argument is undissolvable. Yet he subjoins: nonetheless he tries to respond and struggle out of it, saying that this session was given to the Humanity, not in itself, but in the suppositum. A truly wretched evasion, for which we have already blocked the way above, §11. Bellarmine

concedes, Book 3, chapter 8, §"Hui igitur," that the hypostatic union consists in the communication of the subsistence of the Word. Because, then, through the Union the hypostasis of the Son Himself was made also the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore also through that very communication of the hypostasis made to Christ's human Nature, and the exaltation to the right hand of the Father following it, the flesh of that session at GOD's right hand has truly and really become a partaker. Response: This imaginary triumph of Gerhard's over the constricted Bellarmine is easily dissipated by what has been said. The Lutherist Achilles would indeed have force, if the hypostasis of the Word were communicated identically to the Humanity, as the Word is communicated to it through physical union; therefore the Flesh or Humanity itself has not really and intrinsically received in itself omnipotence, etc., the uncreated attributes. Nor is Bellarmine's similitude between Christ's Humanity and a King's purple well refuted: for although this similitude does not hold in every respect (as elsewhere admits Bellarmine himself, chapter 7), it nevertheless aptly explains the matter here disputed. The similitudes of the hypostatic Union with the union of body and soul, with heated iron, however much they explain the personal union, says Bellarmine. Gerhard wrongly infers from this, theses 37, 38, 39, an entire parity even in the most dissimilar respects.

To theses 40 and 41, on Faber Stapulensis, etc., the answer has already been given above at thesis 15. From this, from Augsburg Confession, article 3, he wishes to note that the session of Christ at the Father's right hand is declared explanatorily exegetically to be dominion over all Creatures, and that in the same place it is asserted that this same session at the Father's right hand befell Christ according to His human Nature. From this, Gerhard says, arises this unmoved argument: "According to whatever Nature Christ has been placed at the Father's right hand, and through that same placement received dominion over all creatures, according to the same He is also omnipresent. The reason of the connection is, because just as that right hand of the Father, to which Christ has been carried up, is divine and infinite, enclosed in no place,

excluded from no place: so also the dominion which Christ received through that placement at that right hand, is divine and infinite, enclosed in no place, excluded from no place, and accordingly is not a dominion of one absent, but present; since Christ does not reign in the manner of this world, but through the mode of GOD's right hand, nor does He use others' service in His government as one absent, but most present to all creatures, in a divine and incomprehensible manner exercises His dominion. But Christ, indeed, according to human Nature, has been placed at GOD's right hand, and through that same placement received dominion over all creatures. For it is said in the Augsburg Confession, article 3, that He ascended to the heavens for this reason, that He might sit at GOD's right hand, and perpetually reign and dominate over all creatures. From which we infer: According to whatever Nature Christ ascended to the heavens, according to the same He also sat down at GOD's right hand. But Christ, according to His human Nature, ascended to the heavens, as is established. Therefore also, according to His human nature, He is omnipresent." Response: The principal Major of the Syllogism is not only not firm, so as to be able to lend force to that "unmoved" argument, but is plainly shaky, indeed openly false. Nor does the reason of connection adduced confirm it. For even if GOD's right hand is infinite, immense, etc., the created dominion conferred on Christ's human nature is not therefore also in itself infinite, immense, uncreated, etc. And just as, even by GOD's absolute power, any creature is incapable of divine omnipotence (since it cannot even produce itself, or reduce itself to nothing), so it is likewise incapable of omnipresence and absolute eternity. But that a local omnipresence should be feigned as necessary for Christ's governance as man is plainly inept, as if one existing in one place of heaven could not know and decree concerning all things which happen well or badly, in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. Response, second: The whole hallucination has occurred to the Ubiquitarians in this matter because, first, they do not discern created Dominion from uncreated: the former is given to the Humanity; the latter cannot even by absolute power be conferred on another. Second,

because they think that to sit at the Father's right hand is formally nothing else than to be of consubstantial excellence, and accordingly to be intrinsically and subjectively GOD, even as to the human nature — which is plainly chimerical, as is clear from what has been said. Response, third: How ambiguous the words of the Augsburg Confession, article 3, are, has already been indicated at thesis 15. Response, fourth: The latter Syllogism is not free from the vice of the fourth term. For in the Conclusion is placed "omnipresent," which appears in neither premise. That you say "to be omnipresent" and "to sit at GOD's right hand" is one and the same thing — Response: this itself is precisely what is at issue, and is without doubt judged by us to be heretical and absurd. So far, then, is it from Gerhard's arguments being "unmoved," that most of the propositions are found to be either openly false, or at least ambiguous and fallacious. Indeed, that unique Minor of the latter Syllogism, which seems less faulty than the others, is in fact overturned by that unpraiseworthy dogma of Ubiquity itself; for how, I ask, if He is everywhere, does He ascend?

Thesis 46, from Bellarmine's hypothesis, Book 3 On the Eucharist, chapters 1 to 9, concerning the real presence of Christ's body in the Holy Eucharist administered simultaneously and at once in many places, Gerhard thus argues: "If in all the places, where the Eucharist is celebrated, the body of Christ is truly and really present, and yet is neither extended, nor multiplied, nor is its substance destroyed, etc., then also, by virtue of the personal Union and of His session at GOD's right hand, He can be present in all places without expansion, multiplication, etc. But the former is true. Therefore." Response: The hypothetical Major lacks glue, and accordingly, without any external push, collapses of its own accord. That one and the same body could divinely (whether by reproductive or by adductive action) be placed in many places, will be established below, in Tome III, from the Catholic sense: that divine Ubiquity is communicated to the Humanity intrinsically and subjectively is chimerical, as is clear from what has been said. The difficulties which, after Hunnius, Gerhard piles up, thesis 47, against the

Replications of Christ's Body, are easily untangled by Catholics in the Treatise On the Eucharist. See here Father Gretser, Tome 2, page 169; nor are they so great that one must flee, as to a place of asylum, to the portentous ubiquity that devastates the whole Mystery. Whether finally the Body, whether of Christ, or of anything else whatsoever, could be replicated into infinite places, saving Faith and Charity, is disputed in the Schools. To me the negative is far more probable. And though it were affirmed, still no support to Ubiquity would follow from this, since this latter is imagined by its Patrons to be a divine attribute, whereas that immense replication is not so. A fortiori it is clear from this that the fifth and last argument (which Gerhard fetches from the Holy Spirits of the deceased Fathers, likewise from the Angels, whom, along with St. Basil, Bellarmine, On the Beatitude of the Saints, chapter 20, says see all things everywhere — Gerhard infers from this, though quite ineptly, that they are therefore also everywhere present, etc.) is much weaker. Nothing here but scattered fragments, entirely dissolved.

Next Gerhard here proposes a third Controversy (utterly irrelevant): "Whether the worship of Latria befits Christ as man?"; and he first cites Bellarmine, On the Beatitude of the Saints, Book 1, chapter 12, that he disputes that not Latria, but hyperdulia, befits Christ's humanity. But note Gerhard's fraud. Bellarmine, in the place cited, speaks expressly of Christ's humanity precisely as distinguished from the Word: and concerning this a purely Scholastic controversy exists, with very many arguing sharply in the negative, whom he cites and follows — Vasquez; and conversely with not fewer, perhaps, holding the affirmative, along with Suarez, in Part 3. It does not at all pertain to the Controversies of Faith. That otherwise Christ as man ought to be worshipped with Latria, and adored together with the Word, is beyond all controversy among all Catholics.

Let us now return to the Calvinist Ames.

Chapter II

On the Knowledge of Christ's Soul. Bellarmine, Book 4, chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Ames confesses that in the first three books On CHRIST there is nothing to attack, except that Bellarmine, Book 2, chapter 19, calls the error of those who say that Christ is GOD of Himself a new heresy — by which he pronounces Calvin free as to the matter, but as to the manner of speaking, without doubt to have erred, and to have given occasion for what has been written of him by Catholics. From this accusation, Ames tries to free his own Master, having produced testimonies of Calvin. But since he nonetheless dissembles another accusation which Bellarmine soon adds — that Calvin, in his Letter to the Poles, and in the book against Gentilis, not only asserts everywhere that Christ is áὐôüèåïò (self-existent GOD), but even asserts that it is improperly and harshly said in the Creed of the Fathers, "GOD of GOD, Light of Light" — this intolerable arrogance of Calvin's, who did not blush to censure the Nicene Fathers, Ames sweetly passes over in silence; and proceeds straight on to Book IV, where he first says there occurs a question (not most necessary) about the Knowledge of Christ's soul, to be briefly dispatched: namely, Was Christ's soul so filled with omniscience from its very creation, that it could in no way progress in knowledge? "The Papists affirm, we deny," says Ames.

Bellarmine's Arguments

I. Isaiah: "A rod shall come forth from the root of Jesse — and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, etc." The same is indicated by all those passages where Christ is said to be anointed by GOD's Spirit, Psalm 44, Isaiah 61, Acts 4 and 10 — where this anointing must necessarily be understood to have occurred at the very Conception: first, because Isaiah joins it with the Incarnation itself; second, because otherwise the Angel would not have said, Luke 2, "There is born to you today a Savior of the world, who IS CHRIST the LORD" — that is, anointed; third, because

John 1: "The Word was made flesh, full of grace and truth"; fourth, because, as St. Augustine, Book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 26, says, it would be most absurd to say that Christ received the Spirit at age 30, when His forerunner received it in his mother's womb. Ames does not deny that this anointing occurred at the instant of the Incarnation; "but," he says, "just as the divine nature somewhat concealed its majesty in the humiliation of Christ, lest it should exercise that dignity which afterward appeared in His exaltation: so also that Spirit of Wisdom was restrained, lest it be exercised immediately in perfection, but gradually according to the reason of Christ's state." Response: There is a great disparity between the two. For that concealment served only for external appearance, and was useful insofar as pertained to the mystery of Redemption to be accomplished through a visible and passible body, to which the interior defect of knowledge, unknown to all, contributed nothing at all.

Second, Ames, thesis 2, sets in place of the second argument, that Christ received grace without measure, John 1, Ephesians 4, last chapter, Colossians 2, and soon responds from Medina: "In Christ grace is infinite; but created Knowledge is finite." But Bellarmine neither said that Christ's Knowledge was infinite; nor did he wish to prove this by those cited passages, but only that He could not progress, because He received without measure, while others receive of His fullness with measure. Thus the whole of thesis 4 does nothing to Ames's point.

Third, to the proof from the testimonies of the Holy Fathers adduced, chapter 3, Ames responded: first, "Medina confesses, Part 3, question 10, article 2, that Ambrose, Dionysius the Carthusian, Epiphanius, Euthymius, and Bede taught otherwise." But in the whole of question 10 (and, I think, in that whole Work) Medina does not even name these four later Doctors, nor even lightly hints at anything of what Ames imputes to him. Ames, second, says: "Most of those whom Bellarmine cites either speak of the person of Christ, or attest what we deny." Response: There is need only of a candid and intelligent Reader, and the vanity of this evasion will easily appear.

Fourth, it is proved from Reason: first, because it is not credible that the Word, having personally become man, would not at the same time have poured out into the Humanity all the gifts of which that soul, which was truly the soul of GOD, was capable. Whence St. John Damascene said: "Those do not believe the Incarnation, who believe that soul progressed gradually." Ames responds: "Since those gifts do not follow the union naturally and necessarily, it is credible that they could, by a certain counsel, be communicated gradually." But it is in no way credible that GOD willed not immediately (with the grace of union) to confer on the Humanity most beloved of Him all the gifts of which it was capable, and whose lack would not conduce to the Redemption to be effected in a passible flesh; for it was for this reason only that the glory of the body was suspended, not without a miracle, which glory was otherwise equally owed to it.

Fifth, Wisdom and grace were natural to Christ as man, as St. Augustine teaches, that is, they were connaturally owed to Him, once the hypostatic Union was established. Therefore without a miracle He could not have lacked them. No reasonable cause, however, can be conceived, why that connatural debt should have been suspended; whence Ames's Reply vanishes.

Sixth, Christ was Son of GOD from the Incarnation, and heir of all the Father's goods, nor ought He to have awaited succession by the Father's death. Therefore He ought then to have been filled with all gifts. Nor does it follow, as Ames wishes, that the same must also be said about His body. In this indeed our Redemption demanded a dispensation: nor was it merely the right, but also the possession of the interior gifts, that suited Him in the highest degree; nor did their lack profit our Liberation.

Seventh, in the very Incarnation He was made head of men and angels. But the head ought not to be less adorned, or less wise, than the members. Nor does Ames's Instance about the glory of the body being suspended avail more here than it did in the earlier cases. This Head, moreover, ought to excel not only as GOD, but also as man — which

would not happen if He had progressed gradually, according to Ames.

Seventh: Adam was created most wise: much more, then, the second Adam at His Conception. Again it does not follow that the same must also be said about His stature. For an infantile stature, which would gradually increase, suited one born of a Virgin, and one who took on passible flesh. What Ames says — that the second Adam, in order to raise us from that ruin, into which the first Adam had thrust us through, willed to descend into the same state (sin excepted) in which he had left us — will be established from what is soon to be said, in answer to the first argument of the Agnoetae and Calvinists.

§2. The Arguments of the Calvinists Are Dispatched

First: Hebrews 2:17: "He ought in all things to be made like unto His brethren"; and 4:15: "Tempted in all things like as we are, without sin." Response, Bellarmine: When sin is excepted, there is understood to be excepted not only sins, but also all those defects which were not useful to the Redemption. And when it is said that He was made like "in all things," by the name of "all" are understood all things which pertain to the perfection of nature, or conduce to Redemption. What Ames replies is a most bare begging of the question: "It is false, and cannot be proved by any least reasoning or authority: first, that also those interior defects, whose singular utility we do not perceive, conduced to redemption as parts of the humiliation. Second, that it conduces to the application of the redemption, that we know Christ to have experienced these our infirmities." If it were so, why should we not, by equal (indeed by even greater) right, have to attribute to Christ the gout, fevers, etc., the most acute diseases? — not to speak of involuntary movements of concupiscence.

Second, Calvin: Luke 2:40: "He grew, and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom, and the grace of GOD was upon Him." And verse 52: "He advanced in wisdom, and age, and grace with GOD and men."

Bellarmine: the word "pleroma" fullness, verse 40, sometimes signifies the same as "overflowing," "full," as it is taken by our Interpreter. Ames rejects this interpretation as neither proper nor genuine, nor fitting this passage on account of the following verse 52, and as signifying more by that word than "to be filled." He says this, but proves none of it. Let it be, however, as he wishes: then, second, the sense is this: that both the created and uncreated Wisdom, which was in Him, filled His bodily organs more and more from day to day, and He was moved with growing readiness toward more excellent works. Ames: "This is something," he says, "but not the whole. For the Evangelist affirms that He was made strong in spirit, not in body, insofar as He was filled with Wisdom." Ekrataiouto tō pneumati, plēroumenos sophias. Nothing more than this is established, however, from these words, than what has been said. Let this too pass, however, as Ames wishes: then, third, it must be said that Christ was filled with Wisdom acquired through His own practical experience of those things which He did not lack in theory. This interpretation, though the Calvinist Junius approves it, saying: "This is precisely what We (Calvinists) affirm," Ames nevertheless replies against it: first, that this phrase is nowhere else found in such a sense, that anyone is said to be filled with wisdom because he experiences those things which he already knew perfectly before. But rightly should suffice the passage of the Apostle, Hebrews 5, where it is said that Christ "learned obedience by the things which He suffered"; likewise St. Ambrose, Book On the Incarnation of the Lord's Sacrament, chapter 7, where he says: "Christ had human nature perfect from the beginning, and yet progressed in human sensation." Second, he says: "By this reasoning He was growing in Wisdom even after the resurrection, no less than in childhood: for then first He experienced what it is to ascend to heaven, to sit at the Father's right hand, etc." Response: let this pass; there is nothing absurd here, nor anything against us, or against truth itself. Bellarmine, fourth: Christ progressed in Wisdom and grace, in the opinion of men, to whom He was more and more, day by day, opening His wisdom. Ames: first, "This is true concerning Christ's person, but the human nature also progressed

in a human manner." Response: this is true of both, as Saints Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, Damascene, Bede, Bernard, cited by Bellarmine, openly teach; in the manner in which the sun, the more it rises toward the middle of the sky, the more it is said to progress in light and heat — not that it becomes more luminous and hotter in itself, but because its virtue more appears. Likewise, just as a Doctor is said to progress in a School, when he renders his hearers learned: so Christ is said to have progressed, because He made others progress. Ames, second: "In the same sense He is said to have progressed in Wisdom, as He progressed in age: for they are joined by Luke. But in reality He grew in age, not merely in opinion. Therefore also in Wisdom." Response: this is Ames's own arbitrary interpretation, which is rejected with the same facility, and with better right, than it is put forward. For why should we not rather stand, in this matter, with the interpretation of the Holy Fathers, than with Ames's? What, third, he brings from St. Thomas, Part 3, question 12, article 2, concerning the increase of acquired Knowledge, is neither against us, nor favors in any way the error of the Calvinists and Agnoetae, provided it be understood of experiential acquired knowledge, as it ought.

Third argument of the Calvinists, from Mark 13:32: "But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the Son." Bellarmine: The Son says He does not know the day of Judgment, because He did not know it in order to declare it to others. Ames replies: "By this reasoning it would also be permitted to say that GOD Himself does not know the day of judgment. Nor could Christ have said that only the Father knows it, if in this sense He is more ignorant of that day than various men, who in every way strive to demonstrate it to others." Response: this is not a feigned sense here, but Christ was speaking as He truly was: the Legate of GOD, who, just as He elsewhere says with John that He made known to the Apostles everything He had seen in the Father — without doubt to be understood with restriction, of all things He willed to reveal through Christ His Legate — so also here, from the very circumstance most known to the Apostles (for how often did Christ say to them that He was sent by the Father?), He restricted the amplitude of His words.

Furthermore, Ames plays the excellent Calumniator, when he says, second: "By this most disgraceful and most fallacious explanation of that equivocation, which is in use with the Jesuits, Christ is constituted the author and approver. For thus what one knows to be most certain, one can, when asked, deny, saying one does not know, simply and absolutely as to the words, provided one mentally intends to deny only that one knows to say it. Thus almost every distinction is removed between true testimony and false lying." Response: Ames, according to the custom of the rest of the Calvinists, especially the English, most falsely and by calumny imputes to the Jesuits a most usual habit of lying and deceiving — of which let Father Andrew Eudaemon-Ioannes be seen, in the Apology for Father Garnet. We say nothing in the present matter, which all Catholics do not commonly teach, namely: that whenever the very circumstances restrict the discourse, it is lawful to utter words in that sense to which the circumstances restrict them; or, if by injury the revelation of a true secret is extorted, it is lawful to utter words at will, either materially and by recitation, or formally and by signification — since in this latter case natural Law does not wish to impose an obligation, and accordingly the signification of words thus forced to reveal a secret, where even silence itself could be a revelation of the secret. See Cardinal Pallavicino, Book 1 On Faith, chapter 2. What, third, Ames says: "Many ancient Fathers (as Maldonatus admits, on these words) — Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Theodoret, Cyril, the Author in Opere Imperfecto — taught that Christ, insofar as He was man, was ignorant of the day of Judgment." Response: Ames stealthily omits what Maldonatus soon adds: "Although this may seem horrifying at first hearing, it can nevertheless have a good sense," which Maldonatus explains in that place.

As a crowning point Ames adds: "That which is mixed by Bellarmine into this Question concerning Christ's prayer being corrected and correction — is a futile and invidious calumny cast at Calvin, not a Controversy seriously to be treated." But let us hear Calvin himself vomiting blasphemies, on Matthew 26, and then leave the judgment to any good man. Thus indeed he speaks: "Christ's vow in the garden was

abrupt. Struck with fear and constricted with anxiety, He was so pressed that it was necessary that amid the violent waves of temptations He should waver alternately in his vows. This is the reason why, having prayed against death, He immediately puts a bridle on Himself, and, submitting to the Father's command, chastises and revokes that vow which had suddenly escaped Him." And below: "This discourse of Christ was not premeditated, but the force and impetus of grief extorted the voice from Him, to which correction was straightway added. By that same vehemence, the memory of the heavenly decree was taken from Him." Thus far Calvin's words, as impious as they are clear; they need no Gloss or Interpreter. Let Ames's accomplices and heralds now say whether they acknowledge that Calvin shamefully lapsed, since he did not fear to attribute to CHRIST not only ignorance, but also forgetfulness and sin — and thus it is clear that the calumny is manifestly Ames's own, twisted against Bellarmine; or if Ames and his accomplices agree with that doctrine of their Master Calvin, thus they are forced to confess that Ames lies, when he denies this to be a controversy to be seriously treated. Ames does not escape either mark here.

Chapter III

On Christ's Descent into Hell. Book 4, chapters 6, 7, etc.

§1. The State of the Controversy is Set Forth

Bellarmine, chapter 7, having set forth the first opinion, of Brenz and Calvin, that to descend into hell is utterly to perish and be extinguished, adds: "This needs no refutation, since it is the foundation of Atheism. For if Christ, who was supported by divinity (as Calvin says), retained an immortal soul in the death of the body, then other men, who are not supported by Divinity, are utterly extinguished in death. Therefore the soul is not immortal." Ames here cries out that Bellarmine, chapter 7, imputes a certain impious opinion to some of his own (Calvin and Brenz), but by a manifest and plainly infernal calumny. But that this is

too true has long since been established, against the evasions of Danaeus and Junius the Calvinists, by Father Gretser on that chapter 7; nor could Ames be ignorant of this, since he has often shown that he has seen this Defense. Why, then, did he not here reply on behalf of his own Master and fellow-disciples, against Gretser? Leaving, then, this impious opinion, Ames proposes another principal Controversy, concerning the real Descent of Christ to Hell: "The Papists," he says, "establish that there are four hells: 1. The prison of the damned. 2. Purgatory. 3. The Limbo of the Fathers. 4. The Limbo of children dying with original sin. Bellarmine contends that Christ's soul truly, properly, and by real presence descended to the Limbo of the Fathers; and adds also that it is probable that it also descended to all the places of Hell, although it freed no one either from the hell of the damned, or from the limbo of children, but only from the limbo of the Fathers, and perhaps also some from Purgatory. Chapter 25. We, however" (Ames continues the Calvinist, joining battle) "acknowledging only one Hell (and not even this except metaphorically), say that this local descent to hell is an idle fiction. CHRIST, however, is truly said to have descended to hell, according to the Scriptures, in a twofold way: 1. Before death, when He sustained infernal torments in His soul, which is to descend to hell metaphorically. 2. After death, while He was held in the state of death, His body remaining in the sepulcher, and His soul separated from it, which is to descend to hell properly, in a general sense." There are here, then, two different questions to be treated: I. Whether Christ's soul sustained the pains of hell? II. Whether the same really descended to the places of hell? The former the Calvinists (with the Lutherans Melanchthon, Brenz, and Gerhard, here), the latter we Catholics, affirm.

§2. It Is Proved That Christ Did Not Suffer the Punishments of Hell

Calvin's doctrine on this matter is, in sum: first, that the punishments of the damned are nothing other than the terror and anxiety of a

conscience thinking that GOD is angry with it. Second, that Christ descended into hell, because He apprehended GOD as if angry with Him on our account, and out of fear of the loss of His own salvation suffered an incredible anguish of mind — such as would be produced, if one knew oneself would perish eternally; whence he even affirms that Christ uttered words of despair, Institutes Book 2, chapter 16, §10 and following, and in the Harmony on Matthew chapter 27: that Christ began to be occupied with hell at that hour in which He began to be sorrowful and to pray in the garden; then descended more deeply, when He cried out on the Cross: "MY GOD, MY GOD, etc."; finally most deeply, when He appeared before GOD's tribunal as a defendant of eternal death, etc., §12 there. Fourth, to this punishment Calvin attributes nearly the whole of our Redemption, so that without this Descent into hell, His death on the Cross would not have been of any value, ibid. §10. This blasphemous impiety of Calvin's Junius and Danaeus have tried to remove from their Master: but because Ames was perhaps convicted by Gretser that this had been shamelessly denied, without any further evasion he undertakes against Bellarmine the defense of his Master Calvin.

First argument, Bellarmine: The Scriptures attribute the whole of our salvation to the blood and bodily death of Christ Himself, and after His bodily death acknowledge no further punishment. Philippians 2: "He humbled Himself, etc." Likewise, Psalm 21, Isaiah 53, describe individually all of Christ's afflictions, but no mention is made of Hell. Matthew 20, Mark 16, Luke 18, Christ foretells His passions, with no mention of the pains of Gehenna, etc. Ames: "The Scriptures attribute our Salvation to Christ's death, not simply and singularly as it was bodily; but as it had the spiritual curse of GOD and of the Law joined to it, Galatians 3:13, and insofar as it was the consummation of His obedience and of His whole humiliation, which was partly bodily and partly spiritual, Philippians 2:8. For Christ underwent that death as our Surety, which had been denounced to Adam and was owed by us: but that death was not merely bodily. It is finally expressly said that He bore our

sorrows, Isaiah 53. Our sorrows, that is, those owed for our defections, are not merely bodily, but also spiritual; and that Christ bore these in His own soul, as a part of that death which He suffered for us, He Himself testifies, Matthew 26:38: 'My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death.'" Response: Ames compiled this evasion from Junius and Danaeus, though in this more cautious than these two, that, since he saw them justly and sharply reprehended by Father Gretser for expressly saying that Christ had to undergo the death of the soul, in order to render us free from the death of the soul, Ames wraps the same matter in other phrases. But it profits nothing. For although, Galatians 3:13, Christ is said to have been made for us a curse, or accursed, no torments of hell are thereby fashioned. The curse of the Cross is not the curse of hell, as the Calvinists' cursed imagination fancies for itself. Much less is the death of the soul and the infernal curse gathered from that consummated humiliation through the death of the Cross. For what connection is there here, and not rather an open contrariety? Or what necessity is there, in order that one liberate another from some pain, to receive into oneself pains of the same species? In a word, nothing infernal is found in all those places alleged; for this first proceeded from the infernal Magisterium of the Calvinists.

Second, Bellarmine: If from that prayer in the garden until the resurrection Christ was in hell, and apprehended GOD as adverse and angry with Him, then He would not have given so many signs of confidence, faith, and trust — while He says to Caiaphas: "From henceforth you shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds"; while He prays for His crucifiers; promises paradise to the thief; commends His soul to the Father. Ames: "That Christ sustained these pains up to the resurrection, we deny. We also repudiate that other phrase ('he was in hell'). It is his own imagination, therefore, not our opinion, that Bellarmine here refutes. As for that other phrase (He apprehended GOD as if adverse and angry with Him), we do not admit it in the sense as if Christ had lost faith and confidence of apprehension (as Bellarmine himself soon acknowledges), but that He did not feel that joy which is

wont to emanate from faith and confidence, and in its place felt pressure and vexation proceeding from GOD's wrath — not against Himself absolutely, but insofar as He was our Surety." Response: first, Ames does not, in accordance with his Master's mind, and consequently does not, deny that Christ was in hell, and sustained His pains up to the Resurrection. For if (according to the mind of the Calvinists) Christ had to taste the punishments of hell for us, when could this more fittingly and necessarily have happened, than after the dissolution of soul and body, as commonly happens among the damned, whose place Christ took? What he says — that Bellarmine soon acknowledges that Christ did not lose the confidence of apprehension (according to Calvin's mind), but only that He did not feel the joy usually emanating from confidence — this, I say, is not found in Bellarmine, but rather directly contrary things, as will be plain to anyone reading. For although, after proposing the six arguments of the Catholics, Bellarmine states that Calvinist evasion in Calvin's own words, yet soon, in §"But the pain," he shows that these words are repugnant to other words of Calvin's own, and to his principal intention. Nor does it matter at all here, those intervals which Ames feigns, so that there would be some place, in the meantime, for those duties which had to be performed before His death. For what use are these intervals, if, as we saw above from Calvin, Christ was always sinking more and more into the pains of hell, and accordingly into the abyss of despair?

Third, Bellarmine: If we had been redeemed through the infernal punishments of Christ, signs ought to have preceded: some Sacrament ought to exist in memory of so great a benefit, as the Holy Eucharist exists in memory of the Passion; the Church ought to celebrate the memory of this benefit, as it does for the rest — the Nativity, Passion, Resurrection; finally Christ ought to be depicted in the fire of Gehenna, in the midst of the damned, as He is usually depicted on the Cross. But none of this is ever read to have been done. Ames, first, retorts the argument, and demands, by what figures, Sacraments, feasts, or paintings the agony of Christ is declared. Response: There is no need that figures,

sacraments, feasts, be shown for each individual part of Christ's sufferings, but for the chief ones, or in general for all together; but of that most singular infernal punishment, and the most horrible of all, nothing of the sort appears. Second, he says: "There is no express figure existing (except among the idolaters) either of divinity, or of the soul, or of those things which properly concern the soul; nor can the active obedience of Christ be conveniently represented in a brute thing." Response: the vanity of this evasion will be plain below, when in Tome II we shall treat of Images. Meanwhile I ask only, do not the Calvinists themselves also paint images in their own brains, through other bodily species, riddling? And Ames seems soon to acknowledge this, when he adds, third: "The spiritual sufferings of Christ were nevertheless somewhat signified formerly by the burning of the holocaust with heavenly fire, and now by that same sacrament by which Christ's whole Passion is declared." Response: This voluntary fiction not only lacks foundation, but also is opposed even to Ames himself, who, Book 1, chapter 5, thesis 2, rejects mystical senses of Scripture, unless it certainly appears that the Holy Spirit intended it. Whence will he show that the burning of the holocaust by heavenly fire signifies the fire or infernal torments? Who of the Fathers and Theologians (outside Calvin's School) ever felt or taught this? Let the formulators of these infernal traditions and new Calvinist Idols see to these fictions.

Bellarmine: The Fathers describe Christ's descent into hell as a descent of Virtue and of a Triumphator, not of a Defendant. Ames, to slip away, says: "There is a twofold Triumph: virtual, in the field, Colossians 2:14, and actual, in a chariot or glorious seat, Ephesians 4:8. In the former sense Christ was simultaneously a defendant and a triumphator; in the latter, however, Christ's descent is plainly opposed to ascent, as humiliation to exaltation, Romans 10:6-7, Ephesians 4:9, Philippians 2:8, so that to describe the ascent of the Triumphator in that sense is nothing else than to describe the descent of one ascending, or to define humiliation as exultation." Response: it is remarkable that Ames should have had so short a memory, that, having said in the previous

thesis that he denies that Christ sustained infernal pains up to the Resurrection, and repudiates this phrase ("he was in hell"), he here, under a given distinction, acknowledging a descent of Christ into hell, presupposes that which he had before rejected. Response, second: of the virtual triumph in the field as of a Defendant, there is not even an apparent mention in the Scriptures cited by Ames in Calvinist fashion, and that whole distinction is a chimerical invention. For how can one be, and be called, a defendant, actually fighting and struggling, and also a Victor and Triumphator? What next, number 3, he tries — to draw Saints Irenaeus, Basil, Jerome, Eusebius over to Calvin's side, since he saw this difficult to persuade, he adds: "Whoever describes Christ's descent so as to understand by descent a virtual triumph: certainly not only without Scripture, but even against the Scriptures. For this expressly teaches that Christ was freed from that hell to which He descended, Acts 2:24. But no one is said to be freed from an act of victory or triumph." Response: He preferred, according to his custom, to twist those sacred words into Calvin's perverse sense, than to follow St. Augustine's double good interpretation. The former is: "the pains of hell being loosed, etc.," that is, being rendered ineffective. For Christ loosed the pains of hell not with which He was held, but lest He be held. The latter: "the pains of hell being loosed" by which he himself could not be held, but by which others were held, whom He knew He had come to liberate.

Fifth, Bellarmine: Calvin's foundation is false, namely that to be in Hell is nothing else than to fear GOD as angry. For this is the condemned heresy of Origen. And what is this but to deny hell altogether, and pave the way for atheism! Nor does Ames escape, when he says that Christ feared not only pain, but also GOD's wrath. But this itself, to fear this concerning the soul's salvation, even with words of desperation (as Calvin attributes these to Christ), what else is this than to feel, in the highest degree, GOD as angry?

Sixth, Bellarmine: If Christ uttered words of despair, He seems to have sinned most gravely. How then could He have redeemed us from sin

through sin? Ames: "We concede the Consequence, if they were properly words of despair, insofar as they were uttered by Christ; but if those same words, which often proceed from despair in men, are called words of despair, in Christ they proceeded from His agony, in which there is no sin." But on the contrary: first, because the punishment of the damned (which Calvin says Christ temporarily sustained) essentially includes despair, just as Beatitude essentially includes perpetuity. Ames replies, denying the Assumption: "The author of the punishment is GOD, the devil, and the sinner; of despair, GOD, the devil, and the sinner. Punishment is a man's passion, despair is a man's action." Response: Even if the damned man is the physically eliciting cause of despair, and its meritorious cause, insofar as it is the object necessitating despair, nevertheless divine decree inseparably annexes perpetuity (and consequently objective despair) to eternal damnation, according to those words of Christ: "Depart into everlasting fire," etc. Ames, second: "Despair does not properly regard the punishment itself, but its continuation forever. It has therefore no place in one who undergoes the same punishment for a short, appointed time, known to himself, with certain hope of liberation, indeed with the power of removing it whenever he pleases. There is a similar calumny which follows, in Bellarmine, concerning Christ's doubting." Response: I deny the Assumption. For only the loss of eternal Beatitude is without doubt a greater suffering than any temporary torment whatsoever. But that Eternity, which necessarily entails despair, the damned evidently know to be inseparably annexed both to the pain of loss and of sense. Whence more than a moral degree separates the punishment of the damned (GOD's enemies) even from the lightest of the most bitter torments of Purgatory of GOD's friends, precisely because the latter know Hope, the former Despair, to be inseparably annexed.

§3. The Arguments of the Calvinists Are Solved

First: Christ is said by GOD to be "smitten and afflicted," Isaiah 53:4,10. What follows from this? Did He therefore sustain the pains of hell? O what a specimen of Calvinist argumentation! Or perhaps they will infer, therefore He at least felt GOD as angry and hostile. But this too does not follow: for what would prevent GOD not only from permitting, but even from inflicting torment and bodily death, and yet at the same time singularly loving that same person? How paradoxically, too, does Calvin pronounce that "all who are smitten, suffer infernal punishments from GOD" — Ames asserts the same, which never occurred to the mind of any Christian before this new Calvinist Gospel. Nor does it help, what Ames reports from the received opinion of St. Thomas and the Scholastics, that Christ's grief was greater than all griefs, without any feeling of consolation, etc. For they speak only comparatively, to the bodily griefs of this life. But what has this to do with the matter? Second, Calvin: "The chastisement of our peace was laid upon Him," Isaiah 53:5. "Every kind of punishment, then, which our sins merited, He suffered, and accordingly the punishments of Gehenna." Bellarmine: So it would follow that Christ's passion had to be eternal. But just as He satisfied for eternal punishment with temporal punishment, so also He could satisfy for the death of souls with the death of the body; because the price of Redemption is weighed by the dignity of the Person who suffers, and by the charity with which He suffered. Ames, first, has recourse to his own Evasion, refuted above near the end of §2, about the non-essential duration of infernal punishment. Second, he says it is a matter of curious presumption to inquire what could have happened, by absolute power, through Christ's death, etc. But Catholics do not do this here; rather they establish what, precisely from Scripture, must be held about Christ's sufferings. Third, he says: "At least, GOD's will being posited, it could not happen, given Christ's passion as our Surety and Mediator, that the justice of GOD be satisfied by a passion of half a human nature." Response: this is a mere begging of the question. It would equally follow from this that, GOD's decree being posited that satisfaction be rendered from the rigor of Justice through Christ, He

could then only satisfy through eternal punishment, equivalent to all the punishments of all the damned together. Too false, therefore, is what the Calvinists always suppose and never prove — that Christ had to sustain the punishments owed to us according to their determinate and specific character.

Third, Calvin: "Christ in this garden, struck with agony and horror unto a bloody sweat, was not so struck from fear of bodily death, which many Martyrs and others have undergone even with exultation. Either, then, He was weaker than all men, or He feared not only bodily death, like the rest, but also the peril of His soul." Response: I deny the sequence. For Christ feared because He willed it; the others, if they do not fear, this is either because GOD infuses greater consolation than that punishment amounts to, or because the Devil stupefies the sense of some of those devoted to him; or because they turn their mind away from thought of the punishments. None of these applied to Christ, who did not permit joy to overflow from the superior part into the inferior, but fixed His mind on all the impending torments. Ames replies much here in words, but with little relevance. For what he asks about the objective cause of this agony, whence it was — the easy response is that He Himself willed all the tortures, ignominy, gravity of sins, which were in fact afterward to be inflicted, to be represented to Himself even in Imagination — sins by which GOD, however great, was intimately known by Him to be offended. Hence, without a solution, into clots of blood. It is without doubt the punishment of Gehenna, a privation of all consolation altogether, as Medina, cited above, rightly says, with no Catholic denying it; but by no means does it follow from this, that wherever a privation of consolation is found, there is also infernal punishment. For how often does it happen that men not only wicked, but even very holy and perfect, are so overwhelmed with sorrow, that they seem to themselves to perceive not a drop of either supernal or infernal consolation — as St. Teresa testifies of herself, that though she generally abounded in heavenly delights, she was nonetheless sometimes, for a short time, so overwhelmed with desolation, that she seemed to

herself unable even to kill a fly for GOD's sake, etc. — yet who but a fool would say that St. Teresa then tasted the punishments of hell? What, fourth, Ames says: "That distinction between the superior and inferior part of the rational soul has no foundation even in sound Philosophy, and is rejected and refuted by the JESUIT Maldonatus regarding this matter, on Matthew 26, from those words: 'Not as I will.'" Response: Maldonatus does not favor the Calvinists in the least in that passage. He only says that Christ then bore Himself in that agony, as if He were purely a man, to whom nothing of the divine decree was known, etc. That distinction between the superior and inferior part of the rational soul, hitherto received in sound Theology and Philosophy, is not at all shaken by the bites of the Novators, who, since they seem to do everything not according to superior reason, or, as St. Thomas calls it, the eternal reasons, but everything according to human, temporal, inferior reasons, cannot therefore prejudice our common nature. See Father Cornelius on Romans 4:22, where among other things he also refutes Calvin's heresy, who abolishes the superior reason, or the interior man, along with free will, and plainly establishes an impossibility, since he thinks that this battle, which Paul depicts in himself in that chapter, is in exactly the same portion and faculty of the soul, and accordingly that even a just man is simply as much a sinner as just — which is a contradiction. What, number 5, he adds, does nothing at all to the matter, or against Us. What, number 6, he denies — that Christ, of His own accord, no compelling pressure driving Him, fixed His mind on all the impending torments — he does not prove the point from Hebrews 12:2. For nothing more is had from this, than that for the joy set before Him, that is, in place of the joy He could have enjoyed, He preferred the passion of the Cross. First, all Martyrs ought indeed to imitate Christ in bearing death: but how does it follow from this, what Ames infers, that they ought not to turn away their thoughts from imminent death any more than Christ deliberately averted them by considered counsel? Certainly this seems to agree neither with Truth, nor with Ames's own intention.

Fourth, Calvin: Christ exclaiming, "My GOD, My GOD, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" showed that He somehow felt GOD's wrath. Response: no mention is made here of GOD's wrath toward the Son, but only of abandonment. For the Deity abandoned the Humanity in its punishments, and did not wish to snatch it away, that the sacrifice might be completed, by which the world was to be redeemed. Ames wishes it: "not indeed that any express mention of wrath is made, but that it nevertheless occurred." But whence is this persuaded to us? Second, that manner of speaking sounds very badly: "The Deity abandoned the Humanity." But since Bellarmine expressly added "in its punishments," and Ames himself proves this abandonment "in its punishments," why then does he practice sycophancy against him? Third, "not everyone who suffers persecution is to be said to have been abandoned by GOD." So it plainly is. But why should it not be best said that Christ's Humanity was abandoned in its punishments, since the Divinity left it to suffer dire torments without any infusion of consolation from the superior into the inferior part? He again begs the question, as before, when without any proof he contends that that abandonment must be GOD's wrath against the Son — which is a merely arbitrary blasphemy.

Fifth, Calvin: "Whom GOD raised up, the pains of hell being loosed." Acts 2:14. For if Christ did not undergo the pains of hell, how could He be freed from them? The double response of St. Augustine has already been reported above, §2, at the end of the second argument. Nor does Ames produce here anything but empty words, by which the Calvinist interpretation — unknown to Christians before Calvin — becomes not even tolerable.

Sixth, Calvin, from Hebrews 5:7: "In the days of His flesh His prayers, etc., were heard for His reverence" or "fear". Response: even if it be granted that eulabeia here does not signify reverence but fear, as, against the Greek and Latin Fathers, only the Calvinists contend against Chrysostom and Oecumenius's interpretation — still not even in the least is it proved that this fear was on account of divine wrath against His

most beloved Son. Certainly neither by authority nor by any reasoning can the Calvinists probably persuade this; and in this, as in all the rest, they most shamefully beg the question. Let more be seen concerning those words of the Apostle in Cornelius, on that same passage.

The last argument of Calvin's Ames omits, because he did not see a way to free his Master from great impudence in citing St. Hilary, since Junius the Calvinist had tried this, in vain, against Gretser.

§4. That the Hells, in Which Christ's Soul Was After Death, Are Subterranean Places Distinct from Sepulchers. Chapter 10.

Since the Calvinists deny that Christ really descended, after death, into hell, but only that His soul, by suffering GOD's wrath in the passion and undergoing the punishments of the damned, while His body was left in the sepulcher, is said to have descended into hell — the Catholic truth must now be proved part by part: first, that by the name "Hells" is meant not sepulchers, but subterranean places; second, that the souls of the just, before Christ's death, were in those hells; third, that Christ's soul also descended to those places. The first, then, is easily proved. First, because from the name for "Hell" which the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin Holy Scriptures use, it can be known where the Hells are. The Latin name "Infernus" is without doubt distinct from the name for "sepulcher." Ames finds a single Instance from Ambrose, who, Sermon 57 and 38, renders those words of the Angels, Luke 24, by which they reprove Mary seeking Christ in the Sepulcher, thus: "why seek ye Him among the hells?" But what has this to do with the matter? Does not Bellarmine speak plainly of the Holy Scriptures? Second, Bellarmine: The Greek word, Matthew 11, where the city of Capernaum is said to be about to descend to hell, cannot be taken for the sepulcher, because the antithesis between heaven and sepulcher would be ridiculous. Nor Luke 16, where the rich man is said to have been in hell, in torments. Ames, since in

reality he had nothing solid to oppose to these, preferred nevertheless to produce something irrelevant to his own case, rather than acquiesce entirely in silence. Third, the Hebrew word "Sheol" signifies "abyss," and ordinarily is taken for the subterranean place of souls, and rarely or never for the sepulcher. Ames wishes Bellarmine to be plainly hallucinating here in this: that he wishes this word to denote only the place of souls, when in the Scriptures it is expressly applied also to the body. Genesis 42: "You will bring down my grey hairs to the hells sheol." Response: Ames errs. For in the phrasing of the Old Testament Scripture, "to bring down to hell" means "to kill someone"; for, heaven being still closed before Christ's Ascension, as many as died were thought to proceed to the Hells — whether they were just (to Limbo and Purgatory) or wicked (to the place of the damned). Second, that it sometimes only occurs for "place," and not for "state," since in Scripture they are usually confused with death, and opposed to life. Isaiah 38:18. Response: Bellarmine does not exclude "state," provided here it not be separated from "place." Third, that so certainly he pronounces the place of souls to be subterranean, since it is expressly indicated, Ecclesiastes 3:21, that the opinion received in the Church (Calvinist) even before Christ's coming, that man's spirit ascends upward. Response: That opinion was unheard of in GOD's Church up to Calvin, which he freely fancies is expressly indicated in the place cited — unless he equally dares affirm the same of the spirit of most wicked men, since Scripture speaks there indefinitely. Fourth, it is false that this word ordinarily designates such a place in the Scriptures. And next he tries, verbosely, to twist to the opposite sense the passages of Scripture adduced by Bellarmine (namely Genesis 37, Numbers 16, Psalm 138, Isaiah 14), and likewise some instances from the interpretation of the LXX and St. Jerome, etc. — all of which, even if they were most true, contribute nothing to the matter itself, since not only does Ames himself, thesis 28, quite openly assign us the consent of the ancient Church, when out of his Calvinist reverence for the Holy Fathers he says: "Many Fathers, in an uncertain matter, wished to establish something certain, and turned out vain in their conjectures

regarding the place of hell — Nothing certain, then, can be proved on this matter from their common and constant consent." But even Calvin, according to Ames's own citation, and much more especially Beza, Calvin's disciple, while arguing against Brenz the ubiquitarian, says that they are blind at noon, who from the history of Lazarus and the rich man do not deduce the true place of the hells, where the damned are tortured; and accordingly fights no less fiercely for real, local, subterranean Hells, to contradict Brenz, than in another Treatise against Castellio, out of hatred of Catholics, he fights to destroy the true, local Hells, or convert them into sepulchers. This is indeed a most notable deed of a Calvinist, worthy of being observed, which Father Cornelius à Lapide examines according to its merit, on those words of Acts 2: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell," which Beza perverts thus: "Thou wilt not leave my corpse in the sepulcher." Giving his reason, why he changed "soul" into "body," and "hell" into "Sepulcher," he answers: "I did not do this rashly, since we see this passage especially twisted by the Papists to establish their own Limbo, and even THE ANCIENTS HAVE ALSO INVENTED FROM THENCE THAT DESCENT OF CHRIST'S SOUL TO HELL." But of this consent of the Fathers we shall again treat, §6. Ames, in order to save Beza's honor concerning that deed of his (clearly enough exposed by Bellarmine), was more mute than a fish. On the contrary, however, thesis 24, number 7, he fashions an imputation of Jesuit impudence against Bellarmine, feigning that he affirmed the consent of ALMOST ALL who could judge on this matter (translation, namely of the LXX, St. Jerome, Chaldaic, etc.), when nevertheless Pererius the Jesuit said, on that same passage, "It is the opinion of the Hebrews and of many Christians, that the word Sheol signifies nothing else than the sepulcher." But if the Greek concerns Ames, let him add that Pererius said many of these Christians were the greatest heretics, and, with equal fairness, also joins a very small number even of Catholics, whom he rightly calls poor Hebraists, etc.

§5. That the Souls of the Just Before Christ's Ascension Were in Limbo. Chapter 11.

The Calvinists began to deny this before anyone else that is known, so that the contrary opinion, which places them in heaven, was utterly unheard of in GOD's Church before Calvin. Nor does Ames dare deny this entirely, but opposes to it a fictitious novelty demonstrated in 26 articles of the Papists by Jewel the Calvinist, of which we treat elsewhere. Then he says: "It is not, however, unheard of, either in the Scriptures or in the Fathers, that the souls of the pious before Christ's coming were in Paradise, or in the bosom of Abraham, in the kingdom of heaven, in a blessed state." But why did he not prove this with a few, or even one single, express testimony? Certainly, that before Christ's coming, in the Old Testament, even one is mentioned who, in a state everywhere blessed, in the kingdom of heaven, in Paradise, indeed even in the bosom of Abraham (for this alone became known from the story of Lazarus told by Christ, Luke 16), was placed immediately after his pious departure from this life — I do not think this can be even probably persuaded, much less established by an open and certain text of Scripture, though this in the present matter would be altogether necessary to prove, in order to introduce an unheard-of Dogma. Furthermore, it could suffice for us Catholics, that for their novelty they produce not even a single apparent reason or authority; for us truly stands the universal sense of the Church for sixteen centuries, and the numerous express testimonies of the Holy Fathers, which he tries to elude. Ames: first, to that of Genesis 37, "Jacob and Joseph were descending to the Hells," he says: "This means, they were dying, as was proved before." But where? We have seen Ames's cold evasions in the previous §, but not even one apparent proof of this Thesis. Second, Luke 16: "There was only a gap, nothing solid, between the place of the damned and the bosom of Abraham. Both souls, then, were in the same abyss, though much distant from each other." Ames repeats many things here, which, even if freely granted, would contribute little or nothing to the matter, since, whatever finally be the case with the

gap or chasm, we hold it certain that a distance is designated such that, by GOD's decree, it does not permit interchange between the state of either party, nor any voluntary transmigration back and forth allowed. And this decree of GOD is metaphorically described, in a human manner, as itself a local interval, which was then still intercepted between the damned and those resting in Abraham's bosom. What is brought forward from Jansen, Cajetan, Sa, Maldonatus, and the Fathers cited by him, injures none of this, but rather confirms it. Third, that Samuel's soul ascended from the earth, 1 Kings 28: this occurred because it could not be evoked by magic arts, just as this shade itself confesses in verse 15, and accordingly was an illusion of Satan. But it is false that Samuel confessed to have been evoked by magic arts. This was done by GOD's command, GOD forestalling the attempts of the witch. If the Ecclesiastical Calvinists held that book among the Canonical, they could not easily doubt that Samuel truly prophesied then, having returned from the dead: for this is indicated clearly enough there. Fourth, that the spirits of the just were in prison, from 1 Peter 3:20, Calvin confesses, along with Catholics. Ames, however, wiser than his Master, says that rebellious spirits are designated there. But if this is taken of the time of Noah's preaching, it is indeed true; but nothing prevents that afterward, when the Flood was coming, before they were drowned, they might have done penance. Fifth, the words of Zechariah, chapter 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of thy covenant, hast sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water" — Ames prefers, with the perfidious Rabbis and rabbinizing Novators, to twist this to I know not what Church, only because through a scribal error the masculine has been changed, in the Hebrew text, into the feminine, contrary to the sense and scope of the whole context; as Cornelius à Lapide well shows on that passage, after Ribera. Certainly St. Jerome, most skilled in Hebrew, confirms the common Catholic opinion from this passage, in these explicit words: "By the blood of thy passion, thou hast freed those who were held bound in the prison of hell, in which there is no mercy."

§6. That Christ Truly Descended into the Hells. Chapter 12.

Omitting the first two proofs, which Bellarmine confesses do not convince the heretics, it is proved: first, from Matthew 12: "As Jonah was in the whale's belly three days and three nights, so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth"; that is, according to His body, in the sepulcher; according to His soul, in limbo. So the Catholics commonly, after Tertullian, Irenaeus, Jerome, Chrysostom, etc. What Ames piles up from some Catholics does not oppose the common Opinion. For he who once speaks of one part, does not exclude the other.

Second, and the principal testimony, by which the point at issue is plainly established, is Acts 2: "Thou wilt not leave My soul in hell." Not without reason do Father Gretser, and we here, wonder at Ames — why they prefer to follow Beza's perversion, altogether inconsistent with itself, rather than hold to (I will not say the well-worn path of ancient and recent Catholic Doctors, but at least) Calvin's own path. For Calvin used to establish, from this passage, in the highest degree, that metaphorical descent of Christ into hell, that is, through the suffering of infernal punishments and the liberation thence effected — which nevertheless is entirely eliminated by Beza's and Ames's perversion. Certainly, at the very first glance, it appears to anyone how harsh and violent is the change of "soul" into "corpse," and of "hell" into "sepulcher." Nor does Ames have any positive argument for himself (as he openly confesses), by which to prove his own perversion; but only, out of a lust for contradiction, he tries to eliminate, or rather elude, the genuine sense. He says, then, first, that he responds from Peter's own express words, verse 31: "David spoke of the Resurrection of Christ." "But Christ rose from death," verse 24, and, as to His body (which is properly resurrected), from the sepulcher. Response: David and Peter both spoke entirely about Christ's resurrection, insofar as He was not left in hell, nor did His flesh see corruption. But what could be said more openly for Us? For when it is said that Christ Himself was not abandoned, His better portion is

understood, namely the soul: and when it is soon added, "nor did His flesh," without doubt Christ's flesh, or of His soul, is understood. For it would be a foolish tautology if the sense here were: Christ's flesh was not left in the sepulcher, nor did His flesh see corruption — which foolish tautology, however, the Calvinists most ineptly attach to the Creed's articles of burial and descent to hell. Second, he says, by manifest consequence from verse 29: "The place or state in which Christ was not left, was one and the same in which David was not left" (otherwise there would be four terms, as they say, in the Apostle's Syllogism). "But that state in which David was left, was nothing other than death, nor was the place other than the sepulcher, verse 29. Therefore." Response: This Syllogism is worthy of a Puritan, whose neither Major nor Minor is found in Scripture; and the latter is openly false, as is clear from the Apostle's own words. For he says, in explicit words, that David did not ascend to heaven, and that his sepulcher still remains: he speaks, therefore, as much with respect to Christ as with respect to David, of both parts, soul and body. And does not any resurrection necessarily include both? Third, he says: "The argument also from the force of the phrase itself, and the scope of the Psalm from which it is cited. Not to leave, is to deliver: to deliver is from evil and misery. But no misery was Christ suffering in the limbo of the Fathers, but in death, in the sepulcher." Response: There is no greater misery to a corpse desiring reunion. There is certainly, in each part, a defect and misery, that things which ought to be joined are not joined. Then it is not necessary to separate what Saints David and Peter joined together, namely, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor my flesh in the corruption of the sepulcher," but "Thou wilt raise up," and reunite each. Next Bellarmine approaches confirmation and declaration. He said: first, psyche properly signifies nothing but soul; and hades nothing but hell. Ames: "If these things be granted, unless it also follows thence that these words in the Scriptures are used only properly." Response: The rule of Tychonius, in St. Augustine, received by all, bids us interpret the words of Holy Scripture in their proper sense, whenever this can be done without

absurdity. But what shadow of absurdity is there here, if soul and hell are taken properly? Indeed, a figurative acceptance here is entirely absurd, which destroys a whole article of the Creed (concerning the descent into hell), always understood in that way by all true and unequivocal Christians. Whence the single Instance from Psalm 147:7 supports or excuses this Bezan-Amesian absurdity not at all.

Second, Bellarmine said: Acts 2 distinguishes soul from flesh, when it says, "neither was His soul left in hell, nor did His flesh see corruption." Ames: "Soul is no more distinguished from flesh, verse 31, than from GOD's holy one, verse 27, Psalm 16:10. What one and the same thing they designate as to the matter, appears from Acts 13:35, where one is put in place of both; and from Acts 2:20, where only one thing is affirmed of David, as could be affirmed of Christ, verse 31, under these two phrases." Response: I deny the assumption, which he does not even lightly prove, since rather the contrary ought to be inferred — namely, that in both places soul is distinguished from body, and the sense of those words, "nor wilt Thou give Thy holy one to see corruption," is clear, "Thou wilt not permit Thy holy one" (in the sepulcher, common to all) to see it. But that by both manners of speaking one and the same thing is intended, namely Christ's Resurrection from the dead, is most true indeed; but this in no way prevents each part of the Compound from being explicitly stated separately in one place, and only one being placed in another. Bellarmine, third: soul is never taken for corpse, since in a corpse there is privation of life, nor can I say that life is in the sepulcher, since there is no life there. Ames: "Bellarmine himself confesses, soon after, in explicit words, Genesis 37 and Numbers 19, that soul signifies body and flesh: a body without life, such as is noted, Leviticus 21:11, Numbers 12:11, is a corpse. Second, life can be said to be in the sepulcher, in the manner that glory is said to dwell in dust, and life to be trodden underground, Psalm 76." Response: first, it is false that Bellarmine soon after (in the response to Beza's third reason) confesses that soul signifies corpse in the places cited. For although a body without life is in reality a corpse, yet in those places nephesh is put, which, as it is said there, signifies both soul, and

animal, indeed also body, and accordingly the adjective "living" is usually added to nephesh as to an indeterminate Substantive, etc., as will be said more fully soon. Response, second: even if, in an otherwise very improper mode of speech, life could be said to be in the sepulcher, there is nevertheless here altogether no reason at all, but the merest lust of Beza and Ames, contrary to the sense of the whole Church, to innovate and turn everything upside down. We have heard the cause of such an insolent audacity, at the end of the fourth §, Beza himself rendering — which ought rightly to suffice for anyone, without any other reason, for exploding this impious invention. Bellarmine, fourth: usage does not admit a synecdoche of a part for a part. Ames: "It is enough for us, if soul, as a part, is put here for the whole, that is, for Christ, who was, as to His body, in the sepulcher." Response: Beza intended something else with his subtleties, which, as Ames himself confesses, Bellarmine rightly refuted with those words. Bellarmine, fifth: There is much difference between Nephesh and Nux psyche. For Nephesh, without any trope, signifies not only soul, but also animal, indeed also body, whence it also nearly always has the adjective "living" attached, because it signifies something indifferent as to living and non-living. But the Greek word psyche and the Latin (anima) are not of such general signification. Besides, soul here is opposed to flesh, neither soul nor flesh. Ames triumphs here, saying: "Bellarmine shows himself reduced plainly to the last resort, when, in order to break out, he cares nothing what or of what quality that which he says is." But this is an entirely imaginary Triumph, since he both truncated Bellarmine's words so that they made no sense at all, and in reality does not have even a single probable argument, by which to defend Beza's musty error; yet here he fashions for himself an illustrious triumph, that concerning the use and signification of a single little word he can catch evasions. Certainly even if we granted all of this, namely that Nephesh signifies exactly the same as psyche and soul, what proof of this results for Beza's cause? If they wanted to prove anything for their own point, they had to show that psyche or soul, taken absolutely, is taken for corpse. Since, then, Ames himself cannot deny that Nephesh in Hebrew

extends more widely than psyche; and that the former is read taken for a corpse, but the latter, when placed absolutely, is never taken for a corpse, it is evident that Beza most badly, on that of Leviticus 21:1 and 11, "over a dead one let him not be defiled," changed "dead" into "soul," only so that, Acts 2, with equal license, he could change Christ's soul existing in hell into His corpse enclosed in a sepulcher. But let us see how the sow taught Minerva. Ames says, number 6: "Bellarmine dreams about Nephesh, that all Logic denies, namely that it signifies something indifferent as to living and non-living; since living and non-living are contradictories, and accordingly encompass all beings and non-beings within their scope, nor can they have anything indifferent or third." Response: This shows that Amesian Logic denies what all sound Logic affirms, namely, that though necessarily one of two contradictories applies to each individual thing on the part of the thing itself, yet there are given universal words and mental concepts, which abstract from the inferior categories. So among Theologians there is given the concept of Wisdom, of Son, etc., precise as to created and uncreated; among Philosophers, the concept of substance, of body, etc., abstracted from living and non-living, although on the part of the thing there is no substance given, except either living, or non-living. Not even novices in Logic are ignorant of this. Whence, since in a matter so plain and obvious Ames not only raves for himself, but moreover dreams that he is a man beyond comparison more learned, one might rightly doubt whether he wrote this soberly and in his right mind, or whether his natural Logic had rather been reduced to the last resort. This is certainly a clear and most notable specimen of heterodox genius. It is a musty invention of Calvin, Beza, and Ames, not only unknown to the Christian Church up to Calvin, but even reprobated by their own Lutheran brothers, who themselves too, on account of a distinct article of the Apostles' Creed, and open testimonies of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, profess a real descent of Christ into the hells. Ames himself did not have even a single foundation for his new Dogma (as he otherwise almost always does in other Controversies) drawn from Scripture, the Fathers, or Reason:

but this one thing he laboriously and, contrary to his custom, verbosely strives at, that he may in any way, by cavils, little subtleties, equivocations, and other unpraiseworthy arts, elude the usual foundations of Catholic Truth exhibited by Bellarmine, and wherever he especially feels himself oppressed by the force of Truth, there with greater contention, and with the noise of contumelious words too, he inveighs against the most wise Cardinal, so that the semi-blind mob of Calvinists may applaud him. But let us survey the rest very briefly.

Bellarmine, third argument, from Romans 10:7: "Who shall descend into the abyss?" That is, to bring Christ back from the dead. Here it is shown that Christ, after death, was in the abyss, which is far distant from heaven, that is, in the deepest parts of the earth. Ames has no other evasion here, except by taking refuge in claiming that here, to descend into the abyss, is the same as, Deuteronomy 30:13, "to cross the sea." But whence does he prove this? Certainly the Apostle interpreted this not of a command of GOD, as Moses did in that passage, but of Christ Himself, when he said: "Who of us can ascend to heaven?"; and, of his own accord (or rather at the instinct of the Holy Spirit), soon subjoined: "Who shall descend into the abyss?" Whence it is clear that whoever willed to accomplish this in the three days of death, had to descend into the abyss, not travel across the sea.

Bellarmine's fourth argument: "He descended into the lower parts of the earth." Ephesians 4:9. Ames adds a splendid Gloss to the Apostle's words, saying: "This means, into the lower part of the World, which is the earth." But the Apostle's words are clear in themselves, and are sufficiently openly contrary to the Gloss. For which of the Philosophers or Grammarians whatsoever would say that the lower part of the World is the same thing as the lower part of the earth? The Apostle's words are so clear that not even the Gloss of the Puritans of Jena departs from the Catholic sense here. It is a wonder that the Calvinists do not notice their own lust for cavilling here. Since so often elsewhere they clamor that the articles of Faith necessary to be believed or understood (whatever these

may be, if not those contained in the Apostles' Creed) are most openly proposed in the Scriptures, yet here, on an article of the Creed necessary, they so wretchedly prevaricate, and stretch every sinew, that they twist the most open words into other words and another sense. And these Testimonies from the Holy Scriptures without doubt establish this, according to interpretation or understanding both fully and readily apparent in itself, and also altogether common and Catholic. To these Bellarmine, chapter 13, joined a most obscure passage from 1 Peter 3 and 4, which without doubt Ames would not have touched, or at least would not have treated so diffusely, if, as he otherwise wishes to appear, he had also here been a lover of brevity as much as of Truth. Setting aside the obscurity of this testimony (even if we granted it to be mere Sibylline leaves, which either elucidating, or rather further obscuring, Ames comments upon most diffusely), Catholic Truth stands firm with itself: and conversely, whatever interpretation of that passage anyone follows, not even an apparent argument can be extracted from it for the Calvinist opinion. It is therefore not worth lingering longer over the discussion of these obscurities, but rather to refer to that passage's Interpreters. Indeed nothing is easier, but equally nothing is more useless for settling Controversies of Faith, than to turn over in every direction the most obscure and controverted passages of Scripture, since otherwise in such matters it is fair game for anyone to abound in his own sense.

Bellarmine next subjoins, chapter 14, a confirmation of the Catholic Dogma of Christ's Descent, from the Tradition of the Holy Fathers, which, since it is most luminous, so that unless the Fathers' open words are violently twisted elsewhere, they plainly establish the point at issue: yet Ames does not lack even here his little evasions and cavils. He says: first, that various Fathers understand by the descent into hell nothing else than the common state of death. Second, that they describe the descent as penal, and as part of the humiliation. Third, they call the liberation of men from hell often a liberation from guilt and from the judgment of imminent damnation. This liberation they attribute not to the local descent of the soul, but to the passion of death. Fifth, from those who

hand down a local descent of the soul, nothing certain can be gathered, either as to the terminus ad quem, or as to the purpose and use of such a descent. But whence does Ames divine that the Fathers understand something other than what their most open words present? Do not most of them say: "He descended into hell alone, but returned with a multitude"; "He went where the souls of the dead were"; "He preached to those who were in hell"; "For all the Saints He descended into hell; thence He recalled the first-formed man"; "He descended into hell, that thence He might free the just"; "The deified soul of GOD descended into hell, that light might shine on those who sat under the earth in darkness and the shadow of death"? The words of St. Augustine alone, however few, ought to have sufficed. For thus, Letter 57: "Nor was the man CHRIST JESUS on that very day to be in heaven, but in hell as to His soul, in the sepulcher, however, as to His body." And Letter 99: "Who, then, but an infidel, would deny that Christ was in hell? THAT HE WAS THERE AS TO HIS SOUL, SCRIPTURE OPENLY DECLARES." By these and similar words, as by the clearest sun's rays, Ames's dark little Evasions are plainly dissipated. What at the end he says — that from the Fathers who hand down a local descent of the soul, nothing certain can be gathered, either as to the terminus ad quem, or as to its purpose and use; and that Bellarmine hesitates in defining these matters, so as to render his whole Defense (I will not say his conscience) rightly suspect in this cause — shows again his notable Sycophancy, and his zeal for deceiving the unlearned. It happens in most articles of Faith, that the very substance of the articles is, among all the faithful, a certain, express, and uniform confession; but concerning circumstances, modes, purposes, etc., saving Faith and Charity, there is room for dispute among Theologians. Whoever, then, thinks that the substance of the articles is shaken or overturned from uncertainty about these matters, is either of miserable folly, or of intolerable fraudulence. Whichever of the two afflicts Ames here, in his sevenfold cavil verbosely drawn out to the end, anyone not incautious and uncouth will observe. Nor do these matters deserve any other refutation.

§7. What Does Gerhard Object in the Present Controversy?

In Disputation IV, Controversy III, he asks: "Does the worship of religious adoration, or Latria, befit Christ as man?" But of this we shall treat in Tome 2, near the end.

Controversy IV asks: "Did Christ, in the time of His passion, feel infernal pains in His most holy soul?" And he tries, from Bellarmine, to draw some support for that suffering of infernal pains. But nothing is contained here which has not already been abundantly discussed in the error of the Calvinists, to which Gerhard nearly gives his support. Controversy V of Gerhard's is thus formed, thesis 61: "Did Christ descend into hell for this purpose, that He might free the souls of the Holy Fathers from Limbo?" He agrees with the Catholics against the Calvinists in the substance of that real descent into the Hells; but he dissents on that purpose, which all Catholics, along with the common opinion of the Holy Fathers, uphold. Let us see, then, what battering-rams he wrests from Bellarmine against Bellarmine. He objects, first, that Bellarmine, On the Beatitude of the Saints, Book 1, chapter 13, §1, from Ecclesiastes 4: proves that the Saints, immediately after death, enjoy the beatific vision of GOD. "But," he says, "if the souls of the just, even in the Old Testament, come immediately after death to GOD, then they are not thrust down first into Limbo, into that upper chamber of the Hells." Response: Bellarmine adds his own Assertion and the solution to this weak objection in that very place, namely, that this became true after heaven was opened through Christ's ascension. Do not even the Lutheran mob openly proclaim this very thing with full mouth even in the Hymn for that Feast? He objects, second: according to Bellarmine, Book 4, chapter 6, §"pe.," Christ's passion is always equally efficacious. "But if Christ's passion is equally efficacious in the Old Testament as in the New Testament, and consequently, just as the pious of the New Testament are directly borne up to heaven by virtue of Christ's passion, without need of any delay in Limbo: so also for the pious of the Old

Testament." Response: Christ's merits are without doubt of the same efficacy for saving all, if all other things are put on equal footing. This condition failing, what wonder is it that they are applied differently to different people at different times in the second act; and specifically, that before Christ's ascension, the gate of heaven not yet having been reopened by the Lamb's blood, none of the Fathers could enter?

He objects, third, to the proof of the Limbo of the Fathers from Zechariah 9:11, that this same Bellarmine, On Purgatory, Book 1, chapter 3, discusses this same passage of the Prophet thus: "Although this passage is generally adduced for liberation from Limbo, yet it fits better the liberation of souls from Purgatory, whom Christ led out." Response: This is a remarkable inference of Gerhard's against Limbo. Why does he not rather thus infer: "It fits Purgatory better. Therefore it fits Limbo well"? For what forbids a single passage or saying from fitting two things — one well, another better?

He objects, fourth, that Bellarmine proves Limbo from Luke 16: "A great chasm is fixed between us." And yet this same Bellarmine, Book 2 On the Word of GOD, chapter 10 and following, disputes with great effort that the Latin Vulgate version is authentic, from which, according to the Council of Trent, one should not appeal to the sources. But that chasm he renders as "chaos," which is a rude and unformed mass. How then is nothing solid interposed between the store (dwelling) of Lazarus and of the rich Epulo? Response: This cavil vanishes from what was said above, Book 1, chapter 111, §4.

He objects, fifth, that Bellarmine, On the Beatitude of the Saints, Book 1, chapter 3, so expounds the Apostle's passage, Hebrews 11:39, as to destroy the foundation for Limbo which Becanus and Cornelius à Lapide seek in it. Response: Bellarmine there gives three expositions, and the second, which is that very one of Becanus and Cornelius, he not only does not reprobate, but even says it is sufficiently firmly supported by the Greek text, although he prefers the third, as more frequent among the Holy Fathers. But how is the foundation for Limbo destroyed by this,

even if he had also denied that it could be confirmed from that passage of the Apostle, since he himself, in this very chapter 21, has abundantly confirmed it by many other texts of Holy Scripture besides? Is the foundation of some Dogma therefore subverted by a Doctor, if he thinks it is not convincingly established from this one passage, but from many others? Necessarily ignorant must be a Doctor, of whatever Sect he be, who thinks thus, since among all it is nothing more common, than that besides Testimonies of Scripture convincing according to each different part, there are usually also produced others which seem probably to persuade some, but plainly not others. And these are those Gerhardine battering rams — shall I say most powerful, or the weak little arrows of small children?

Chapter IV

On Christ the Mediator. Bellarmine, Book 5.

§1. The State of the Controversy

Bellarmine: We call a Mediator him who interposes himself as a middle between certain parties who are dissenting, or at least not conjoined, so that he may bring them to concord, or join them by a new covenant. This can happen, however, in two ways: first, by a certain substantial mediation; second, by an operation. In the first manner Christ can be called Mediator according to His personality, which connects two Natures, though not dissenting, since Christ's Humanity was never contrary to the Divinity. But of this Mediation the question is not asked, but of that by which CHRIST, innocent, reconciled sinners to the Father. Ames, first, plainly repudiates substantial Mediation, and makes the dispute purely one of a name, and it does nothing to the present Controversy. Second, he says: "That assumption itself of human nature under the form of a servant was part of Christ's humiliation, and accordingly of that operation by which He carried out the office of Mediation, Philippians 2:7." Response: This cannot be said, because that

assumption is an action of GOD alone. Therefore it is not part of Christ's humiliation, since it necessarily precedes it, and this latter presupposes it; and Christ's own soul, already (in its prior nature) hypostatically united to the Word, was free to choose for itself either a glorious or a passible body, as with other Scholastics Aldrete learnedly teaches on Part 3 of St. Thomas, from that passage of Hebrews 10: "Sacrifice and oblation Thou wouldest not, but a body hast Thou prepared me, etc." Third, it does nothing to the matter, that human nature as it exists in us (whose cause Christ was pleading) was most hostile to GOD. For how is it inferred from this (as Ames absurdly intends), that Christ's Humanity was dissenting or contrary to the Divine? Fourth, Christ's substantial Mediation can altogether, indeed must, be distinguished in this Controversy from His operation: for it functions here merely materially, and as a principium quod, not however as a formal principle, eliciting the operations pertaining to the Office of Mediation: nor is anything asked here about the operating suppositum, but this is presupposed on both sides. And although our Mediator had no other purpose for that substance, than that through it He might carry out the parts of a Mediator (which Ames indeed asserts, but does not prove; others, however, quite probably, if not with entire certainty, deny), still even so the substantial Mediation does not come directly and formally into question.

Bellarmine, second: Mediation in the work can occur in four ways: first, by discerning and judging the cause, as arbiters do; second, by relating, back and forth, pacts, conditions, as messengers do; third, by praying and supplicating; fourth, by paying and satisfying. Concerning all these modes this Question can be understood: "According to which Nature does the office of Mediator befit Christ?" Ames: "This question is understood of all those things, which Christ has done and does, either on our behalf before GOD, or on GOD's behalf before us, for the reconciliation of us to GOD and GOD to us. All these things also pertain to Christ's Mediation: of which, however, not the least part, which is placed in Christ's kingdom, Bellarmine has omitted." But what are those

omitted things? Perhaps they will be named in the course of the Disputation.

Bellarmine, third: The common opinion of Catholics is, that the principium Quod which worked the works of the Mediator, was GOD and man together: but the principium quo by which those works were done, or their formal principle, was the human Nature, not the divine. The Calvinists and Lutherans contend that Christ exercises the office of Mediator according to both Natures as formal principle. Ames: first, "The principium quo, and formal, by which some effect is produced, is nothing else than that force of the cause, which makes such an effect exist. If, then, the Papists deny that the divine Nature was a principle of this kind in Christ's Mediation, procuring our salvation, then either they knowingly establish that the divine nature exercises no force at all in this whole business, then they deny that principle received also among the Scholastics themselves, that the reparation of the human race was made through GOD man, since He could satisfy as GOD, but as man had to satisfy: then they strip the whole of Christ's Mediation of divine value and dignity: then finally they openly contradict Scripture, which explicitly affirms that Christ offered Himself to GOD through the eternal Spirit, Hebrews 9:14." Response: We entirely deny that the divine Nature was a principle physically influencing the operations required for the office of Mediator. Nor is there any inconvenience in this, that the Divinity only confers moral worthiness on the theandric actions elicited by the Humanity: nor is that received statement among the Scholastics, in the least, shaken; for just as GOD, without physical influx, conferred infinite value on human operations, whence we in no way strip the whole of Christ's Mediation of value and dignity. Finally, we much less contradict Scripture, which by those words means nothing more than that the Spirit of GOD excited Christ's Humanity to the aforesaid actions. Excitation, persuasion, etc., however, do not physically influence the works of the one excited, but only morally, as is self-evident.

Ames, second: "We, however, so contend that Christ exercises the office of Mediator according to both natures, that we establish community in the work, but a distinction of virtue and manner in the operating natures. Thus we say that CHRIST suffered according to His human nature, but sustained and overcame what He suffered by the power and virtue of His divine nature: that He satisfied in His human nature: but that the value, efficacy, and application of that satisfaction proceeds from the divine nature: finally, that all the human operations of the Mediator are exercised by Christ according to His human nature, and the divine ones according to the divine. This opinion is largely confirmed by that concession of Vasquez, Part 3, Disputation 85, chapter 3: 'Per se and reduplicatively it cannot be said: This man, insofar as man, is Mediator, or GOD, insofar as GOD; but GOD-man, insofar as GOD-man, is Mediator.'" Response: This certainly, but most briefly, expresses the Calvinists' opinion; why then was there need of that longer paraphrase? Vasquez does not favor Ames. What Vasquez indeed says, and we all confess, namely that Christ, insofar as GOD-man, is Mediator, from this it does not follow that there is not one eliciting principle, another rendering worthy.

§2. Arguments of the Catholics

I. From 1 Timothy 2:5: "One Mediator of GOD and men, the man Christ JESUS." What Ames says is false, that nothing more follows from this, than that Christ the Mediator is a man. For why would "man" be added, unless to express the nature according to which Christ is Mediator, as St. Augustine best notes? Ames: "He expressed the nature according to which He is Mediator, but not according to which alone." But why, I ask, would he not express both, if both were the case? Ames: "The reason was, to remind the faithful, that they should not despair of any kind of men, but should pray for all, because Christ, made man, sustained a common person, not of this or that kind of men, but of men." Response: This reason, born in the little brain of Ames, is not even lightly

hinted at by the Apostle. Why would he not similarly (if not more excellently) admonish to do this, if the Apostle had added that Christ, not only as man, but also as GOD, is our Mediator? But Ames still presses on, and says, number 3: "By similar reasoning one could conclude, that Christ has power to remit sins only according to His human nature, because Matthew 9:6 it is said, the Son of man has power to remit sins." Response: There is a luminous disparity, because it is sufficiently established that power to remit sins primarily befits the divine nature, which not even the Pharisees doubted. But here it had to be expressed, who is our Mediator.

2. Bellarmine: The Apostle distinguishes the Mediator from GOD: "One," he says, "GOD, and one Mediator." Therefore according to His human nature only Christ is Mediator. Ames: "The same Apostle also distinguishes Christ from man, Galatians 1: 'Not by man, but by JESUS Christ.' It does not follow from this, however, that Paul called Christ only according to His divine nature. Christ, however, is rightly distinguished from mere GOD and from mere man, as He is theanthropos GOD-man." Response: Again it is argued from a disparate case, and accordingly nothing follows. The Apostle only wants to indicate that he was not called by man alone and merely: from this, however, it is in no way inferred that the Apostle was called by mere GOD, and not by Christ the GOD-man. But in the matter proposed, since the Apostle expresses that the mediator is man, and expressly separates him from GOD, he manifestly attributes the office of Mediator to man alone.

3. Bellarmine: The Holy Fathers deny that Christ is Mediator insofar as He is GOD. Ames thinks he knows better than the Fathers what they meant. He says: "The Fathers wish to indicate nothing else, than the necessity of the personal union in Christ the Mediator. They deny, therefore, that He who is simply GOD, is Mediator, so as to show that He is Mediator insofar as He is GOD manifested in the flesh." Response: This Calvinist gloss openly repugns to the text of the Holy Fathers. For

how could Theologians in the Schools, or Bishops in Councils, even today have expressed our dogma in clearer words, than when, with other Fathers, St. Augustine, in all the Tomes of his Works, so often affirms: "Insofar as man, so far Mediator; but insofar as He is the Word, He is not intermediate, because equal to GOD, etc."? But Ames arrogates to himself the privilege of explaining the Holy Fathers and the Scriptures, such as Executioners exercise on the rack against defendants, that they may say what they do not wish.

Bellarmine, fourth: A Mediator must be middle, that is, distant from each dissenting party, in some way. But Christ, as GOD, is not at all distant from GOD. Ames finds no other Evasion here, except by falling back on substantial Mediation, not only against Bellarmine's express protestation that this is not being treated here, but even against Ames's own confession, that the name "mediation," in its proper signification, is not a name of substance. How then does he dare here, by help of this improper signification (about which there is no question here), to decline or elude the force of this most effective argument?

Bellarmine, fifth: Christ is not Mediator according to both natures at once, because thus He would not be distant from GOD the Son, neither by person, nor by nature. Here too Ames thinks he has found a crack, and says: "He is distant as to the economic state, in which that person exists under another form, as the Apostle says, Philippians 2:7." Bellarmine already admitted this before, chapter 1, On Christ, as being a substantial Mediator. Again Ames deceives with words, and most fallaciously indeed. Nothing less than what Ames attributes to him did Bellarmine confess, chapter 1, as will be plain to anyone reading. That "economic state" does nothing here to the matter. For the Humanity united to the Divinity could not cause the nature and person of the Word to be distant from GOD.

Bellarmine, sixth: If Christ were somehow Mediator according to the divine nature, then the Father and the Holy Spirit too would be Mediators. Ames: "This follows no more than this: if the Son of GOD

were somehow incarnate according to the divine nature, then the Father too and the Holy Spirit would be incarnate. To act as Mediator befits the divine nature, not as nature, but as existing in such a mode, which mode does not befit the Father or the Holy Spirit." Response: Again in a plainly disparate case Ames feigns an equal force of the consequence. For the Incarnation, precisely, immediately, and formally, occurred in the hypostasis, and not in the divine nature; but this same divine nature (according to the Calvinists) would formally be the principle Quo by which the office of Mediator would be exercised, and by no means personality. Therefore it would equally, necessarily, denote all divine persons as eliciting the works of Mediation.

Bellarmine, seventh: To sacrifice, and by sacrificing to satisfy, cannot befit GOD according to Divinity, since this is the work of a subject. Therefore neither can the office of Mediator. This argument is plainly convincing and apodictic. Since to sacrifice can only befit an inferior to a superior; and accordingly if the divine nature of the Word sacrificed to GOD the Father, the Son will be less than the Father, which is open Arianism. Ames has nothing to oppose except mere beggings of the question, and Suarez falsely cited. What he says from Hebrews 9:14 — that Bellarmine's subtlety fights against these express words of Scripture, "through the eternal Spirit He offered Himself" — has already been refuted above, §2. And how, I ask, do these propositions expressly amount to the same thing: "Christ, through the eternal Spirit, offered Himself"; and "the Holy Spirit offered Christ"? A hard weapon is necessity! And yet this is what it is to ENERVATE BELLARMINE!

Bellarmine, eighth: From the opposite there follows heresy and confusion, if there be one operation of both natures as their proper and principal cause; which itself is the heresy of the Eutychians and Monothelites, condemned in the VI Synod, Act 17. Ames: "No confusion or heresy follows, if two formal principles, according to their distinct virtues and operations, are said to concur, cooperating toward the same work. There is a great difference between operation and work;

and between motion, and the thing made by motion. This moderation, at least, in the work of mediation, the divine nature exercised, by which it came about that the efficacy and dignity of that work should proceed from the Divinity." Response: He does not extricate himself from Eutychianism or Monothelitism by this Evasion. For those two formal principles, divine and human nature, according to their distinct virtues, would have to concur toward one and the same indivisible sacrifice. But this is altogether impossible as to the divine nature, unless this and its operation be confused with the human — which is the very marrow of Eutychianism. There is not a greater difference between "work" and "operation," than between the "being made" and the "having been made" of a thing. The offering of the sacrifice, however, whether in the making or in the fact of having been made (even if we granted this freely), cannot without the sacrilege of Arianism be attributed to the divine nature. Much less the rendering-worthy, which morally emanates from the Word into the works of the Humanity, is in any way a physical operation, as said above, or an influx and real efficiency of the Divinity into that work. For then that efficacy, and accordingly the sacrifice, would no more belong to the Son than to the Father or Holy Spirit, since all operation is common to them, because it befits them through the divine essence. Ames does not know how to reply to this, nor does he shake it in the least: whence he plainly does not touch the sinew of Bellarmine's argument, except that by truncating what is said, he seems to himself to enervate it.

§3. The Arguments of the Calvinists Are Diluted

I. John 10:17: "I lay down my life for or, of myself." Christ says this as Mediator. But the human nature is not an act. Bellarmine: To lay down one's life is a man's, not GOD's. For it is nothing else than to die; just as to take up the life again is nothing else than to rise again; although the power of laying it down and receiving it again at will was given by GOD to that man Himself, as Saints Augustine and Chrysostom expound.

Ames: "Although to lay down life passively is to die, and to take up life passively is to rise: yet if these phrases are taken actively (as here they necessarily must be), then to lay down life is freely to let go of life in death, and to take up life is to raise up one dead. These, however, are not a man's." Response: Much is here involved in equivocation. If the discourse is about moral power, that is, the free consent of the will, Christ's humanity most freely accepted both the passible body and death itself, imminent from the Jews; without that free consent it could never have been killed. If we speak of the physical power of dissolving the union of soul and body, and again joining them at the resurrection: this was, again, without doubt principally in the divine nature; instrumentally in the human nature, or in the three days of death in that most holy soul separated from the body — so that, in every rigor, this proposition is true: "Christ's soul freely laid down and took up again His body." Whence vanish the cavils which Ames here heaps up, as when he says, first: "If this power (he speaks only of physical power) was given to the human nature, then the human nature has divine power." So it is: it has an instrumental virtue divinely conceded, just as for any other miracles: it does not, however, have thereby the very divine Omnipotence subjectively and intrinsically in the human nature, as has been shown above against the Ubiquitarians. There is here the same equivocation on "divine power," which I noted in the recent "Musaeus," Question X, §2, number 1. Second, he says: "By the opinion of all the Scholastics, Christ dead was not man; how then could Christ as man have had power of taking up His soul again?" Response: That power, both moral and physical, was in the soul itself, as said. Third, he says: "Christ's dead flesh had neither human will, much less power of accomplishing what it willed." So it is. But what has this to do with the matter? Cajetan and Toletus, whom he cites, rightly say that this power principally belongs to the divinity, but by no means deny that it was conferred divinely on the soul, as the common instrument of the Divinity for accomplishing miraculous works. Medina, Part 3, question 6, article 3, is badly cited by Ames, there being nothing on this matter there. In bad faith too he set forth St. Augustine's opinion,

as reported by Bellarmine, omitting the other, plainly contrary to it, namely: "Most manifestly, as man, He speaks, I have power to lay down My life, etc."

Ames: "GOD was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself," 2 Corinthians 5:19; hence it is shown that GOD had some part in procuring the reconciliation. Bellarmine: To be reconciled is not always a Mediator's act. GOD did not reconcile as Mediator, but through a Mediator, whom He procured and sent. Ames: first, "The reconciliation made by Christ was that of a Mediator." Response: as of man joined to the Word, I grant it; as of GOD, I deny it. Ames, second: "GOD, existing personally in Christ, reconciled the world to Himself, as Cajetan interprets that passage. Christ, therefore, as reconciler and Mediator, was not only man, but also GOD." Response: I deny the Antecedent and the Consequent, according to the Calvinist sense; according to §2 I concede the whole. For these words can conveniently admit either sense; namely, that GOD was the one rendering worthy, not the one eliciting the works of the Mediator. Ames, third: "The same Apostle expressly attests, Acts 20:28, that the Church was redeemed by Christ's blood. Therefore Christ, GOD-man, not only procured the Mediator, but also fulfilled the office of Mediator." Response: This is conceded entirely, according to §2, namely that GOD-man, according to human nature, elicited the satisfactory actions, to which the hypostasis of the Word conferred infinite value.

III. Ames: "Although the words of Calvin are not found on Hebrews 4:14, 'passed into the heavens, etc.,' and 7, 'without father and without mother': in these, nevertheless, there is more strength, than that they can be eluded by Bellarmine's response." Bellarmine: These rightly prove that the Person of our Pontiff is divine. For truly JESUS is the supreme High Priest, who has penetrated the heavens, and who is without father, without mother, and simultaneously has both Father and Mother — He is GOD; but not, insofar as He is GOD, did He penetrate the heavens, nor as man does He lack a mother, or have a father, and finally He is not a

Priest insofar as He is GOD. For indeed the power by which Christ was penetrating the heavens was from GOD; but that very penetrating of the heavens, since it is to be moved from place, cannot befit Christ according to the form of GOD, which is immutable, but only according to the human form. By equal reasoning, Christ as GOD lacks a Father, but as man; He lacks a Mother, but as GOD. The same, however, has a Father, because He is GOD of GOD; and has a Mother, because He is the Son of man. Finally, GOD the Word (as Saints Athanasius and Cyril openly teach) is a Priest, but according to the form of man. Thus far Bellarmine, all of whose words it pleased me to enumerate here, so that it may be established to everyone, how truly Nethenus boasted: "In this marvelous Compendium, Bellarmine's arguments (why not also his Responses?) are so compressed by Ames, that their vanity often appears better from them, than from Bellarmine's own prolix disputation, which he also overturns and scatters with equal power." Let us see, then, the striking specimen of the Amesian Compendium: "This rightly proves that the person of our Pontiff is divine: the power by which Christ penetrated the heavens was from GOD, but GOD the Word is a Priest according to the human form." Let us now hear the fantastic triumph of the ENERVATOR, when he soon subjoins: "Bellarmine concedes here the whole of what we want. The person of the Mediator was divine: the virtue by which He performed the work of Mediation was divine: under the form of man this person was Mediator. If, then, by 'according to the form of man' he means a human, not divine, virtue, then he plainly contradicts himself: because he simultaneously affirms that the virtue was from GOD, that is, from the divine nature." Thus Ames triumphs! I would do a middling learned Reader an injury, if I wished to explain his most mendacious stratagems one by one. The equivocation in "divine virtue" has already been indicated a little before, which once observed, this Puritan's most weighty fraud becomes clearer than the noonday sun. But not yet is the end of the Triumph. He subjoins, thesis 14: "Bellarmine also delivers to us the whole cause, in eluding the testimonies of the Fathers, chapter 7, where he concedes: first, that in certain works of Christ the actions of the

Deity and Humanity concurred; second, that all Christ's miracles were partly divine, partly human; third, that a substantial Mediation, not merely of human, but also of Divine nature, was necessary, in order that the works of the Mediator be of infinite value. For, first, no works of Christ are more divine, than those which concern Redemption, which not unjustly is regarded by some as a greater work than Creation itself. Second, whoever recognizes no miracle in the work of Redemption, is himself a miracle, or rather a monster. Third, if the substantial Mediation of both natures was necessary for the dignity of the operation, then certainly for the very operating: for no dignity redounds from the nature into the operation, unless that nature operates." Thus he most fully fills the measure of a glorious Triumphator, or rather of a fraudulent Impostor! Bellarmine, indeed, most clearly solves a threefold Objection of the Calvinists, drawn from Saints Dionysius, Irenaeus, and Augustine, which in reality contains no difficulty at all, especially since the mind of those Fathers is most openly consonant with us, from their testimonies, chapter 4. Let us survey Ames's triple-headed cavil. First, Bellarmine truly said that in certain works of Christ (namely miracles) the actions of the Deity and Humanity concurred. Now when Ames subsumes: "But no works of Christ are more divine, than those which concern Redemption, etc." — he plainly deceives, or is deceived. For to suffer, to pray, to sacrifice, etc., are in no way miraculous works, which by their nature require, principally, to proceed from GOD alone, but from the Humanity already instructed with supernatural gifts. Who would call this into doubt? Second, it is most true that all Christ's miracles were partly divine, partly human. But no work can be assigned pertaining directly and immediately to our Redemption, which, considered in itself, is, or even could be, that of the Divinity itself. For to pray, to sacrifice, to suffer (by which precisely our Redemption was accomplished) are repugnant to the Deity; nor can the divine nature therefore be said to co-effect these (excluding general concurrence, of which nothing is treated here), because it beforehand bestowed on the Humanity created supernatural gifts, by mediation of which it elicited these actions of

Mediation. It is miraculous that the humanity be assumed hypostatically by the Word, that it be infused with as-it-were infinite grace and light of glory, etc. But these things being once established, it is no miracle, but altogether connatural, that this Humanity should exercise the most humble actions, which it perceives to be most acceptable to Divinity. It is, then, a bogeyman, which Ames threatens as a monster. Third, as certain it is that substantial Mediation had necessarily to be presupposed for formal and actual Mediation itself, in order that this latter derive from it its dignity and infinite value; equally false is it, that it therefore specially concurred by cooperation toward the satisfactory operations. It is too false, that a special cooperation of the divine nature and rendering-worthy suppositum is also required for the dignifying of the work. Christ's purely human works, freely exercised, in themselves entirely indifferent, were all and each of infinite dignity and value (as the Scholastics commonly hold, Part 3) from the suppositum, to which they are reckoned as works elicited from the humanity: but who would therefore say that Christ could not, without special and miraculous concurrence of GOD, eat, walk, etc.? Whence it is plain that, apart from sophistic trifles (or certainly an intolerable and altogether incredible ignorance), there is nothing to marvel at in that Amesian Triumph.

IV. Calvin: To renew hearts, and to give the Holy Spirit, are works of the Mediator, but are works of GOD alone. Bellarmine: To do these meritoriously, is proper to the Mediator: but to do these efficiently, and as the author of the gift, is not the Mediator's. Ames: "To deny this efficiency to be Christ the Mediator's, is nothing else than to deny that all power in heaven and on earth was given to Christ. Matthew 28:18: to give His own eternal life, John 10:28; to baptize us in the Spirit and fire, Matthew 3:11; to send the Spirit from the Father, John 15:26; to preserve His own in this world, Matthew 28:20; and to raise them up on the last day, John 6:54. In sum, this is nothing else than to deny that Christ efficaciously is JESUS or Savior." Response: These are the terrors of children, the mockeries of the learned. Bellarmine excellently conceded the meritorious cause, and denied the efficient cause; nor do Ames's

exaggerations, however futile and puerile, obtain anything further beyond that. I show this manifestly. Suppose (what is in fact most true) that Christ the Mediator, by His prayer, sacrifice, passion, death, etc., merited all the means by which we are led to glory. Suppose again (which will never happen for eternity, and, as I think, is impossible) that after all the mysteries of Redemption, Resurrection, Ascension, etc. had been accomplished, the hypostatic union were destroyed; I now ask, would salvation, and all the means conducing thereto, still accrue by virtue of Christ's merits, to the predestined? Who would doubt it? It is, therefore, purely accidental to the very office of the Mediator, formally and precisely considered, that now, as a matter of fact, Christ our Lord's humanity also, as an instrument of GOD, concurs toward most of those things which he seemed, with such great emphasis, to hurl against us as darts of Holy Scripture. I say "most," for to send the Holy Spirit does not seem to rest in any way with the divine person of the Father and the Son alone. But this matters little.

V. Finally, Ames complains that Bellarmine obscurely proposed one other reason of Calvin's, concerning Christ's mediation between GOD and the Angels, drawn from far afield, and thought he could burden Calvin with unjust suspicions, meanwhile leaving out Calvin's first Reason: that in Christ as Mediator one must believe; the second, that as Mediator He holds supreme command in heaven and on earth; third, that He joins us with GOD; and fourth, that He makes us partakers of the divine nature. "These reasons, along with various Scriptural testimonies, Bellarmine dissembles, etc." What is this but to fight the Sophists by boldly fleeing? Response: All these have been already read. To the first, the Consequence is denied. To the second, the Assumption is denied. To the third and fourth, it is clear from the response to the previous fourth Objection.

From what has thus far been disputed against the Calvinists, three Cavils are also easily solved, which Gerhard constructed in Disputation IV, thesis 70 and following. He also proves, at thesis 79 and following,

from Bellarmine, that without knowledge of Christ and Faith embracing His merit, no one is saved, which is not controverted, since all Catholics affirm this, at least outside the case of invincible ignorance, and speaking generally. Finally, he is ridiculous, when he closes the whole Disputation, having proposed a purely Scholastic controversy: "Would the Son of GOD have been incarnate, if man had not fallen?" Namely, because Bellarmine, against Scotus and others, taught with St. Thomas and others innumerable, the negative — he is a witness to Lutheran orthodoxy! Trifles upon trifles!

§4. Whether Christ Also Merited Anything for Himself? Chapters 9, 10.

Ames here compensates for a parsimony of words with a great abundance of errors. "We establish two things, most certainly, on this Question (not very necessary)," he says: "1. That opinion which the Papists uphold on this matter is either false, or at least in part uncertain, and in part repugnant to itself. 2. That it is of curious rashness to attribute to Christ, with respect to Himself, any merit other than the way or manner of arriving from humility to glory." Let us hear with what certain reasons he supports these so certain claims of his. He thus infers: "The Papists teach that Christ was, from the instant of His conception, a perfect comprehensor and blessed one. But it is not a comprehensor's, but only a wayfarer's, to merit anything for himself, according to Scholastic doctrine." Here Ames stops. Does he wish us to infer: "Therefore Christ, who did not merit as comprehensor, merited as wayfarer"? Not exactly! But he says: "They do not explain to us, whether He primarily merited for Himself, if secondarily for us, or vice versa; nor do they define whether the merit by which He acquired something for Himself, was merit of congruity or of condignity; or by what pact or covenant it rested; nor have they yet shown, how one and the same merit has proportion both to freeing sinners and to exalting the just; nor finally do they give an adequate reason, why or how Christ had the glory of His

body and exaltation of name from merit, and not the glory of His soul." Response: Even if we could explain none of this, and determine something of certain faith about the manner and circumstances, must we therefore suppress the substance of this Dogma, sufficiently clearly delivered in the Scriptures? By this method (most usual with our heretics, throughout most of all the Controversies), if it were to be used, all the dogmas of the Faith could easily be entirely destroyed. But this is manifestly the perverse method of perverse men, who, when they ought (if they loved and sought truth) to investigate uncertain and unknown things from what is certain and known, themselves, in preposterous order, try to shake and demolish, from modes and circumstances not yet explored but left to scholastic debate, the certain Decrees of Faith. Response, second: Without doubt He merited it principally for us — for this was the intended end of the Incarnation itself in a passible cross — the other merit He held only concomitantly. Response, third: All rather suppose than explicitly define that all Christ's merit was of condignity. For all and every one of Christ's works were of themselves meritorious of infinite reward with condignity; the same holds for the covenant, at least implicit. Whence it is also clear that there was a superabundant proportion, not only for freeing sinners, but also for exalting those innumerable ones, if for obtaining their justice Christ's merit had been destined by GOD. Response, fourth: A disparity too manifest is assigned between the glory of the soul, which was owed to Him from the instant of Conception as consubstantial Son of GOD, and whose lack would have contributed nothing at all to our Redemption; and the glory of the body, which was miraculously and dispensationally deferred, so that He could suffer for us, in a body like ours, sufficiently. More may be seen occurring throughout the Scholastics. But what I have said is nearly established among all.

Next Ames, thesis 20, adduces Bellarmine's response from St. Thomas, Part 3, question 19, article 3: because it is better never to lack the soul's glory, than to merit it. But it was better for the body to lack glory for a time, and acquire it from merit, than to lack the dignity of

meriting. For it is better, other things equal, to have something from merit, than without merit. Against this response of St. Thomas, Ames presses: first, "That is false, which is placed as a foundation, that it is better to have something by merit, than without it. For it comes closer to the mode of perfection, which is found in GOD, to have something without procuring it by laborious merit." Response: St. Thomas's foundation, well understood (namely, of one who is capable of increase of accidental perfections), is most true. For it pertains to the praise of a rational creature, through free obedience to merit due perfections of nature, than idly and merely gratuitously to receive them. He presses: "There is one glory of the whole of human nature, which by one and the same right ought to be required, not one part from merit and another part without merit." Response: This is indeed a pure begging of the question. For what else is here in controversy? Of similar cloth is the third Instance, where he says: "If any dignity accrued to Christ by meriting, then it accrued especially to the soul." Response: This accrued, that it might have a fitting dwelling for itself, namely a glorious body. He presses, fourth: "A blessed soul is not in a state of meriting." Response: I deny this. See Father Esparza on the Incarnation, question 40.

Ames continues, §21, and says: "Philippians 2:9, 'wherefore' and 'therefore,' necessarily prove nothing other than a congruent parity of reasoning between Christ's humiliation and His glorification. A similar phrase is alleged by Bellarmine from Matthew 16, 'And I say unto thee, thou art Peter,' which proves nothing less than a meritorious cause. For Peter's confession did not merit that he should be constituted the foundation of the Church and its Monarch, because then all who make the same confession would also be admitted to the same Principate. By a similar argument Bellarmine could conclude that Christ also imposed a law of meriting on the Priests, Matthew 21:24: 'If ye tell me, I also will tell you'; because there it is similarly used. And Hebrews 12, 'for the suffering of death,' signifies that death was the end of humiliation, not the cause of glory." Response: It would be foolish, having spurned the common interpretation of the Holy Fathers, to bend to the insipid perversion of

the Calvinist Ames, as if it were enough to say many things, and prove nothing. Ames without doubt noticed that Calvin's arguments objected against Catholics have been utterly crushed by Bellarmine, nor do others more robust survive; lest he be entirely silent, he thought to indulge himself with insipid cavils. Peter without doubt did not merit with condignity the Principate of the Church by that confession, but Christ judged it congruous, that when He willed to commend His Church to one of the Apostles, He should rather decorate with this reward him who, by an excellent act of Faith, had merited it, from his own Divinity, more than the rest. It is a puerile inference: "Therefore all who make this confession also merit the Principate of the whole Church." Trifles, rubbish, hissing and stamping of petulant boys' merits!

He finally ends the Chapter and § with these words: "Bellarmine concedes that the Son of GOD did not descend, that He might acquire something for Himself, and does not deny that all glory was owed, without any labor, to His human nature itself: There appears, then, no other reason, why the Papists so greatly contend that Christ merited something for Himself, than that they might cast the foundation for their doctrine about the merits of men; whereas nevertheless they do not dare attribute to Christ that freedom of will, which they establish to be so necessary for man's meritorious work, that from the reason of merit they usually demonstrate this one thing: namely, the power of acting either well or badly." Response: Man's liberty and merit will be asserted below, in Tome 4, ex professo, against the heresies. That conjecture of Ames — why we so urge Christ's merit — lacks foundation and is quite vain. But this ignorance in a Theologian is by no means to be tolerated, that he thinks that for all merit, the freedom to act badly is required. Nor did that lynx-eyed Puritan see that, this being posited, he is driven to confess one of these two: namely, either that Christ could have sinned, or that He could not have merited anything even for us. Although from what has been said, chapter 2, it seems to be supposed by the Calvinists, that Christ, before the Resurrection, could have sinned, and accordingly that GOD could be damned, and become worse than the Devil, etc. — which,

whoever should concede (Capreolus used to say of old), ought to be coerced not so much by Reasons as by flames. This, indeed, is the very target that Calvinist piety takes aim at, against Christ, so that they strip Him of privilege, or of liberty, or of merit, or of impeccability!

END OF BOOK TWO.